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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT TYPE AND REPORTING
RELATIONSHIP ON INTERNAL AUDITORS’ JUDGMENTS
by
Douglas M. Boyle

This study examines the effects of internal audit reports issued to external
stakeholders (the public) and internal audit reporting relationship types on internal
auditors’ judgments. I use a 4 x 2 between-subjects experiment and practicing internal
auditors as participants. I manipulate internal audit report type at four levels ((1) no
external report issued by the internal audit function [current state of practice], (2)
descriptive external report of internal audit activities, (3) assurance external report on the
internal controls, and (4) a descriptive external report of internal audit activities and an
assurance external report on the internal controls). Senior level internal audit’s reporting
relationship is manipulated at two levels (primarily to management or primarily to the
audit committee chair). I examine the effects of these independent variables on internal
auditors’ fraud risk and control risk assessments.
I find that the issuance of an internal audit report (IAR) to external stakeholders
affects internal auditors’ judgments. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk
assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no
external report. Additionally, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal
vii

auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. Overall, there is evidence that internal
audit report type and reporting relationship each affect internal auditors’ judgments,
increasing the conservatism of certain risk assessments when accountability to
stakeholders or the audit committee increases.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page…………………………………………………………………..………………i
Copyright Page………………………………………………………………..…………..ii
Signature Page……………………………………………………….…………………...iii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………….iv
Abstract……………………………………………………………….….........................vii
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………ix
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………...x
Chapter 1 - Introduction…………………………………………………………………...1
Chapter 2 – Literature Review…………………………………….……………………..17
Chapter 3 - Methodology…………..…….………………………………………………28
Chapter 4 – Data Analysis and Findings………………………………………................49
Chapter 5 – Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research……………………………..74
References………………………………………………………………………………..78
Appendix A – Institute of Internal Auditors First, Second, and Third Request…………83
Appendix B – Copy of Case Instrument…………………………………………………87

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1

4 X 2 Experimental Design and Expected Cell Sizes……………………………30

2

Instrument Flow……………………………………………………………….....33

3

Fully Completed Experiments…………………………………………………...48

4

Fully Completed and Passed All Manipulation Checks…………………………51

5

Demographic Information………………………………………………………..53

6

Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………………..56

7

One-way ANOVAs………………………………………………………………56

8

Overall MANCOVA Results…………………………………………………….59

9

ANCOVA Results Fraud Risk and Control Risk………………………………...62

10

Planned Contrast Testing to Isolate Effect of Report Type on Fraud Risk……...63

11

Report Type X Relationship Type in Control Risk ANCOVA………………….63

12

ANCOVA Results Control Testing Hours and Justification to CFO……………65

13

Planned Contrast Testing Results Test Hours and Justification to CFO………...66

14

Survey Responses Perceptions of IARs and Actual IAF Oversight……………..73

x

1

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
This study responds to previous calls for research and examines whether
differences in internal audit report type and internal audit’s reporting relationship have an
effect on internal auditors’ fraud risk and control risk judgments. The study provides
insights into influences on internal auditors’ judgments, as well as evidence to advance
the dialogue on internal audit reports issued externally and optimal internal audit
reporting channels.
Specifically, this study examines the effects of internal audit reports issued to
external stakeholders (the public) and internal audit reporting relationship types on
internal auditors’ judgments. I use a 4 x 2 between-subjects experiment and practicing
internal auditors as participants. I manipulate internal audit report type at four levels ((1)
no external report issued by the internal audit function [current state of practice], (2)
descriptive external report of internal audit activities, (3) assurance external report on the
internal controls, and (4) a descriptive external report of internal audit activities and an
assurance external report on the internal controls). Senior level internal audit’s reporting
relationship is manipulated at two levels (primarily to management or primarily to the
audit committee chair). I examine the effects of these independent variables on internal
auditors’ fraud risk and control risk assessments, tasks that are central to the role of an
internal audit function (IIA 2010b).
Previous authors have called for research on internal audit reports and reporting
channels. For example, Archambeault et al. (2008) call for internal auditors to consider

issuing formal, external reports to stakeholders, and they specifically cite the need for
research on the effects of such external reports on internal auditors’ judgments. Beasley
et al. (2009) find that many internal audit functions have reporting channels to the audit
committee and management that are “murky”, raising questions about the party to whom
internal audit truly is accountable. The Institute of Internal Auditors (2003) calls for
research on the impacts of different internal audit reporting channels.
I find that the issuance of an internal audit report (IAR) to external stakeholders
affects internal auditors’ judgments. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk
assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no
external report. Additionally, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal
auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. Overall, there is evidence that internal
audit report type and reporting relationship each affect internal auditors’ judgments,
increasing the conservatism of certain risk assessments when accountability to
stakeholders or the audit committee increases.
When asked about their perceptions of IARs, the participants indicated a moderate
degree of support for the issuance of an activities-based (descriptive) IAR, citing that
such a report may provide recognition to the internal audit function (IAF), elevate the
status of the IAF, improve corporate governance, and enable benchmarking opportunities.
Participants who did not support the issuance of a descriptive IAR indicated that it may
provide limited value, may not be consistent with the role of an IAF, may be too
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costly/time consuming, and may lack required organizational support. Overall, the
participants believe that the issuance of a descriptive IAR would increase the total IAF
budget by an average of over 17 percent.
The participants indicated a modest degree of support for the issuance of an
assurance-based IAR, citing that such a report may increase responsibility and risk to the
IAF, may not be consistent with the role of the IAF, may overlap with the external
auditor’s work, may be costly and require significant time/resources, and represents a
significant change that may not be supported by the organization. The participants
indicated the costs associated with issuing such a report would be extremely high, a mean
of 78 percent (43 percent) of the current IAF budget for public company (non-public
company) participants.
The results also reveal that, in actual practice, the balance of internal audit
reporting for the non-public company participants resides with management, for both
oversight and budget determination. The balance of oversight for public company
participants resides equally between management and the audit committee chair
(consistent with Abbott et al. 2010), and resides primarily with management for budget
determination. Thus, in actual practice, the participants serve in IAFs with significant
accountability to management, rather than the audit committee.
This study has four potential practice implications. First, the results provide
management and audit committee members with insights into how to design internal
audit report types and relationship types to promote effective corporate governance.
These issues are long-standing questions within the practice community, for which
limited academic research has been performed. Specifically, the findings of the study
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show that report types and reporting relationships affect internal auditors’ risk
assessments. Report types and reporting relationship types that increase internal audit’s
accountability to stakeholders and to the audit committee result in more conservative
judgments. Second, the study highlights the significant potential costs of externallyissued IARs, which must be weighed against the expected benefits. Third, in their actual
organizations, participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management,
rather than the audit committee. Such reporting relationships may impede the
effectiveness of the IAF, as well as the overall effectiveness of corporate governance,
given that the internal audit function plays such a pivotal role in the governance process
(Abbott 2010; Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004). In addition, there may be
implications for the effectiveness of others within the governance mosaic, such as the
audit committee and the external auditor who rely on the work of the IAF to fulfill their
roles. Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers, particularly the
Securities and Exchange Commission, as it governs U.S. public company disclosures. I
encourage the SEC to carefully consider the costs and benefits of externally-issued IARs,
especially as this area of research grows.
Finally, the study has implications for research and theory. The study utilizes
accountability theory and agency theory to examine a key area of corporate governance.
In applying these theories in the context of corporate governance, researchers are better
able to understand how greater accountability of internal auditors may induce greater
conservatism and monitoring, tenets of agency theory. In addition, the study responds to
previous calls for academic research and provides a complement to earlier work (Holt
and DeZoort 2009) that examined the effects of IARs on investors’ judgments.

4

The Institute of Internal Auditors states, “Internal auditing is an independent,
objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an
organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk
management, control, and governance processes” (IIA 2010a). This role requires the
internal auditor to serve several stakeholders, perform a wide range of duties, and balance
sometimes-conflicting requirements. This study investigates certain issues (i.e., report
types, relationship types, fraud risk assessments, and control risk assessments) related to
the internal audit function (IAF) and its role in governance. Gaining insight into these
areas is important given the critical role the IAF plays in effective corporate governance
(see Gramling et al. 2004). Cohen et al. (2004, 136) emphasize the significance of the
internal audit function as an important part of the corporate governance mosaic and state:
…governance reforms (i.e., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the resulting SEC and
stock exchange regulation) have emphasized the significance of the internal audit
function as an important part of the governance mosaic. For example, companies
listed on the NYSE are now required to maintain an internal audit function and
the audit committees of such companies are required to meet with the internal
auditors without the presence of management. Increasingly, boards and audit
committees view internal and external auditors as partners who must work
together for ensuring the highest quality of financial reports are provided to all
stakeholders.
The internal auditor is in the unique position of having daily access to the internal
culture, management, processes, and activities of the organization. This access may
provide the internal auditor the opportunity to detect corporate governance, risk, or
control issues in a manner that other actors in the governance mosaic (i.e., external
auditors, directors) often cannot, based on their distance from the organization.
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Internal Audit Report
Given the significant role that the IAF plays in the governance of an organization
(Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004), it is a potential shortcoming of governance
design that internal audit continues to be the only key player in the governance mosaic
not to make disclosures or express assurances that are available to external stakeholders.
Instead, current governance disclosures and assurances to external stakeholders focus
only on management, the board and its committees, and the external auditor
(Archambeault et al. 2008). Internal audit typically does not provide any information
about its composition, responsibilities, or activities to outside stakeholders, nor does it
provide any external assurance to stakeholders. However, some have discussed whether
such disclosure and assurance from the IAF to the external stakeholders would provide
useful information to the public, while positively affecting the behaviors of the IAF to
improve the corporate governance of the organization (Archambeault et al. 2008).
To address this lack of externally-available information about internal audit,
previous authors have called for the consideration of an Internal Audit Report (“IAR”) to
external stakeholders (Holt and DeZoort 2009; Archambeault et al. 2008; Lapides et al.
2007). This IAR would provide disclosure from the IAF directly to the external
stakeholders and could address the composition, responsibilities, and activities of the
IAF, as well as certain forms of assurance. Such information could provide useful
insights into the role of the IAF in corporate governance.
To begin to examine whether an IAR provides valuable information to
stakeholders, Holt and DeZoort (2009) examine the user side of the IAR setting and
evaluate the extent to which a descriptive IAR affects investor confidence and investment
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decisions. Their results indicate that participants provided with a descriptive IAR
(addressing the IAF’s activities) have more confidence in financial reporting reliability
and assess perceived company oversight effectiveness higher than participants without
access to a descriptive IAR. The IAR effect on confidence in financial reporting
reliability is particularly evident for high fraud risk companies. Self-insight results show
that the IAR is perceived to be as useful as several currently required disclosures, such as
the Audit Committee Report, Management’s Discussion and Analysis, and
Management’s Report on Internal Controls. Thus, based on Holt and DeZoort (2009), it
appears that a descriptive IAR would provide valuable information to external
stakeholders.
Research has not yet addressed any effects of an IAR issued to external
stakeholders on internal auditors’ judgments. Archambeault et al. (2008, 5-6) cite one of
the expected advantages of such IARs to be enhanced accountability for internal auditors,
and they call for research on this issue:
Interview results provide evidence that supports accountability and increased
diligence as benefits of IAR disclosure. For example, one internal auditor
participant suggested that “the report would help address questions about what
internal audit does… increased transparency may lead to increased quality
standardization of, and investment in, internal audit activities.” The interviews
also revealed suggestions that an IAR would provide incentive for management to
provide more support and access to internal auditors. For example, one internal
auditor recognized the “potential for increased resource allocation for internal
audit if such disclosure is made.” Similarly, one policymaker highlighted that
“management might not want to reveal a lack of support for the internal audit
function.” One of the audit committee member participants stated that “the net
benefit of the report would be to hold the internal audit function and management
to a higher standard of accountability.” [emphasis added]
Later the authors state (p. 10), “While we describe the IAR’s potential to complement
existing governance disclosures, we emphasize the need for additional research and
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discussion by policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to further evaluate the merits
and specify the nature of such disclosure.” The authors also call for cost/benefit research
on implementing and maintaining an IAR to external stakeholders.
Based on Archambeault et al. (2008), this study investigates whether the
provision of an IAR manipulated at four levels (to capture four levels of accountability –
no external report issued by internal audit [current state of practice], descriptive external
report of internal audit activities, assurance external report on the internal controls, and a
descriptive external report of activities and an assurance external report on the internal
controls) affects internal auditors’ judgments when performing fraud risk and control risk
assessments.. This study also examines internal auditors’ degree of support for such
reports and the perceptions of the benefits and costs of such reports.
Internal Audit Reporting Channel
Internal auditors typically have a dual reporting structure, where they report to
both management and the audit committee. This structure varies across organizations and
often places the internal audit function in a somewhat conflicted position. The Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA) calls for that the head of the IAF to receive strategic direction and
reinforcement from the audit committee chair, while also reporting to management for
assistance in establishing direction and support, and as an administrative interface (IIA
2010a). While internal auditors have access to and operate within the organization, they
are required to provide independent and objective assurance on the effectiveness of the
risk management, control, and governance processes of the organization as part of their
role in the governance mosaic (IIA 2010a). The IIA defines independence and objectivity
as key components of an effective IAF, as stated in The IIA standards and guidance (IIA
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2010a, 3-4). In addition, The IIA identifies objectivity as one of its four mandatory
principles under its Code of Ethics (IIA 2010a, 3-4):
The chief audit executive must report to a level within the organization that
allows the internal audit activity to fulfill its responsibilities. The chief audit
executive must confirm to the board, at least annually, the organizational
independence of the internal audit activity. The internal audit activity must be free
from interference in determining the scope of internal auditing, performing work,
and communicating results. Internal auditors must have an impartial, unbiased
attitude and avoid any conflict of interest.
Internal auditors exhibit the highest level of professional objectivity in gathering,
evaluating, and communicating information about the activity or process being
examined. Internal auditors make a balanced assessment of all the relevant
circumstances and are not unduly influenced by their own interests or by others in
forming judgments.
Thus, The IIA recognizes internal audit’s dual reporting role and the potential for the
IAF’s independence and objectivity to be affected by its reporting structure. While this
definition of the role of internal audit includes the key stakeholders needed for the
function to be effective, it creates inherent conflict and accountability confusion, which
may affect the judgment of the internal auditor. Several academic authors have provided
additional insight into these issues that illustrate how the IAF’s reporting channels to both
management and the audit committee could affect the independence of the IAF.
First, Gramling and Hermanson (2006) discuss the requirement for the IAF to
serve two roles and offer suggestions to internal auditors on how to add the greatest value
in this matrix-reporting environment. The first role discussed is to the board for
governance matters, and the second role is to management, primarily to provide
consulting services. The authors state (p. 38): “To have the greatest value to the board,
internal auditors should think of their primary role as a resource to the board and its audit
committee, and should develop the internal audit function accordingly.”
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Second, Christopher et al. (2009) identify threats to maintaining the independence
of the IAF. The most significant threats to independence include the following (p. 200):
Using the internal audit function as a stepping stone to other positions; having the
chief executive officer (CEO) or chief finance officer (CFO) approve the internal
audit function’s budget and provide input for the internal audit plan; and
considering the internal auditor to be a “partner”, especially when combined with
other indirect threats.
With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, significant threats
identified include the IAF not reporting functionally to the audit committee; the
audit committee not having sole responsibility for appointing, dismissing and
evaluating IAF leadership; and not having all audit committee members or at least
one member qualified in accounting.
Third, Beasley et al. (2009) conducted interviews of audit committee members
and found that internal audit’s reporting relationship with the audit committee and
management often is “murky”. The authors state (pp. 36-37): “In many cases, the
oversight of internal audit is shared between the audit committee and management in a
fairly informal, sometimes contentious manner… Overall, there was a substantial lack of
clarity in internal audit’s reporting channels… there is significant potential for internal
audit’s loyalties to be divided as a result of multiple reporting channels (i.e., to the audit
committee and management).”
Fourth, Barua et al. (2010) examine audit committee characteristics and
investment in internal auditing using 181 SEC registrants. The study finds that the
internal audit budget is positively related to the frequency of audit committee meetings.
The study also finds that internal audit budget investment is negatively related to the
presence of auditing experts on the audit committee and audit committee member tenure.
These findings indicate that the characteristics of the audit committee are associated with
the budget determination of the IAF.
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Fifth, using surveys of 134 chief internal auditors from Fortune 1000 firms,
Abbott et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between audit committee oversight of
the IAF and the amount of the IAF budget allocated to internal-control-based activities.
Oversight was measured with a series of questions requesting the participants to indicate
their level of agreement using a five-point Likert scale: internal audit reports to the audit
committee, internal audit reports to the Chief Financial Officer, internal audit reports to
the Chief Executive Officer, the audit committee has authorization to terminate the Chief
Internal Auditor, the CFO has authorization to terminate the Chief Internal Auditor, the
CEO has authorization to terminate the Chief Internal Auditor, the audit committee
determines internal audit’s annual budget, the CFO determines internal audit’s annual
budget, and the CEO determines internal audit’s annual budget.
The study finds a strong positive relationship between increased audit committee
oversight of the IAF and the amount of the IAF budget allocated to internal-control-based
activities. In addition, the study finds that the audit committee shares a near-equal
oversight role with management related to the IAF. When the IAF is resource constrained
by a budget, the dual reporting channel may cause competing directives from the audit
committee and management, whereby the audit committee has motivation to support the
allocation of resources to internal control related activities and management may support
the allocation of resources to consultative activities.1 Thus, Abbott et al.’s (2010) results
indicate that the IAF’s reporting relationship may affect the allocation of IAF resources.

1

Also see Carcello et al. (2005), Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003), Quarles (1994), and Pei and Davis
(1989) for additional discussion of reporting channels.
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Finally, the Institute of Internal Auditors’ Research Opportunities in Internal
Auditing (2003) raised the following research questions related to internal auditor
reporting channels:
1. Are there inherent conflicts in reporting responsibilities when internal auditors
report to both the audit committee and to various levels of management?
2. What is (are) the potential impact(s) of having the IAF report to different
organizational levels (e.g., board of directors in general, audit committee, the
CEO, the COO, the CFO)?
3. Is there an ideal reporting relationship for the IAF? What are the parameters of the
ideal reporting relationship, and what are the primary determinants of the ideal
reporting relationship?
4. What type of internal audit structure enhances the accountability of governmental
entities?
5. How can the IAF best increase accountability to various stakeholders?
These research questions have not yet been extensively investigated, which provides
further motivation for the current study. Given the sometimes-unclear reporting structure
for internal audit, it is important to understand the effect that the IAF reporting channel
has on the judgments of internal auditors.
The literature I reviewed indicated potential conflicts within the dual reporting
structure of the IAF between management and the audit committee, which may threaten
the independence/objectivity of the IAF. There also remain several open research
questions regarding the potential effects of the IAF’s reporting relationships that will be
specifically addressed by my study including:
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1. Does the reporting relationship of the IAF affect the judgments of internal
auditors when performing fraud and control risk assessments?
2. Where does the balance of reporting for the IAF currently reside (with
management or the audit committee chair)?
3. Which governance player (management or the audit committee) currently
determines the budget of the IAF?
Overview of Study
This study investigates the following three issues that have been identified as
areas for future research and of significant importance to the practice and policy
formulation of the internal audit function:
1. The effect of internal audit reports to external stakeholders on internal auditors’
fraud risk and control risk assessments, using four manipulated levels of report
type (no external report issued by internal audit [current state of practice],
descriptive external report of internal audit activities, assurance external report on
the internal controls, and a descriptive external report of activities and an
assurance external report on the internal controls),
2. Internal auditors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of externally-issued
internal audit reports, and
3. The effect of internal audit’s reporting channels (reporting primarily to the audit
committee chair and to management) on internal auditors’ fraud risk and control
risk assessments.
The study uses a 4 x 2 between-subjects experiment (four report types and two
relationship types) with 108 practicing internal auditors as participants. The participants
13

were obtained from the membership of three IIA chapters, who received email invitations
to participate in the study using an online instrument. I find that the issuance of an
internal audit report (IAR) outside the company affects internal auditors’ judgments.
Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments are higher (more conservative)
when the IAR is assurance-based or both activities and assurance-based than when the
report is only activities-based or there is no external report. Additionally, the results
indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive reports primarily to the Audit Committee
Chair (as opposed to management), internal auditors’ control risk assessments are higher
(more conservative). This relation is marginally significant for fraud risk assessments.
Overall, there is evidence that internal audit report type and reporting relationship each
affect internal auditors’ judgments, increasing the conservatism of certain risk
assessments when accountability to stakeholders or the audit committee increases.
When asked about their perceptions of IARs, the participants indicated a moderate
degree of support for the issuance of an activities-based (descriptive) IAR, citing that
such a report may provide recognition to the internal audit function (IAF), elevate the
status of the IAF, improve corporate governance, and enable benchmarking opportunities.
Participants who did not support the issuance of a descriptive IAR indicated that it may
provide limited value, may not be consistent with the role of an IAF, may be too
costly/time consuming, and may lack required organizational support. Overall, the
participants believe that the issuance of a descriptive IAR would, on average, increase the
total IAF annual budget by over 17 percent.
The participants indicated a modest degree of support for the issuance of an
assurance-based IAR, citing that such a report may increase responsibility and risk to the
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IAF, may not be consistent with the role of the IAF, may overlap with the external
auditor’s work, may be costly and require significant time/resources, and represents a
significant change that may not be supported by the organization. The participants
indicated the costs associated with issuing such a report would be extremely high, a mean
of 78 percent (43 percent) of the current IAF budget for public company (non-public
company) participants.
The results also reveal that, in actual practice, the balance of internal audit
reporting for the non-public participants resides with management, for both oversight and
budget determination. The balance of oversight for public company participants resides
equally between management and the audit committee chair (consistent with Abbott et al.
2010), and resides primarily with management for budget determination. Thus, in actual
practice, the participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management,
rather than the audit committee.
This study has four potential practice implications. First, the results provide
management and audit committee members with insights into how to design internal
audit report types and relationship types to promote effective corporate governance.
These issues are long-standing questions within the practice community, for which
limited academic research has been performed. Specifically, the findings of the study
show that reporting relationship types and report types affect internal auditors’ risk
assessments. Report types and reporting relationship types that increase internal audit’s
accountability to stakeholders and to the audit committee result in more conservative
judgments. Second, the study highlights the significant potential costs of externallyissued IARs, which must be weighed against the expected benefits. Third, in their actual
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organizations, participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management,
rather than the audit committee. Such reporting relationships may impede the
effectiveness of the IAF, as well as the overall effectiveness of corporate governance,
given that the internal audit function plays such a pivotal role in the governance process
(Abbott 2010; Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004). In addition, there may be
implications for the effectiveness of others within the governance mosaic, such as the
audit committee and the external auditor who rely on the work of the IAF to fulfill their
roles. Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers, particularly the
Securities and Exchange Commission, as it governs U.S. public company disclosures. I
encourage the SEC to carefully consider the costs and benefits of externally-issued IARs,
especially as this area of research grows.
Finally, the study has implications for research and theory. The study utilizes
accountability theory and agency theory to examine a key area of corporate governance.
In applying these theories in the context of corporate governance, researchers are better
able to understand how greater accountability of internal auditors may induce greater
conservatism and monitoring, tenets of agency theory. In addition, the study responds to
previous calls for academic research and provides a complement to earlier work (Holt
and DeZoort 2009) that examined the effects of IARs on investors’ judgments.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Accountability
In the academic literature, “accountability” refers to being answerable to
audiences for performing up to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling
obligations, duties, expectations, and other charges (Schlenker et al. 1991; Schlenker and
Weigold 1989; Schlenker 1986). When people are accountable, they can be made to
explain and justify their conduct, and their behavior can be scrutinized, judged, and
sanctioned by audiences (Tetlock 1985, 1992; Semin and Manstead 1983). The board,
audit committee, internal audit, and external audit serve in the role to scrutinize, judge,
and sanction on behalf of the external stakeholders, and management serves as an agent
of the external stakeholders and is the subject of such oversight processes.
The notion of accountability discussed above is consistent with how
accountability is implemented in business practice under effective corporate governance.
However, with several parties (with potentially varying levels of information,
capabilities, and motivations) exerting accountability over management (with potentially
its own set of information, capabilities, and motivations) on behalf of a wide range of
external stakeholders, the application of this notion is complex (see Cohen et al. 2004).
The “corporate governance mosaic,” as described in Cohen et al. (2004), illustrates the
complexity that is created by the diverse needs of the wide range of external stakeholder
groups (which include the courts and legal system, regulators, financial analysts, stock
exchanges, legislators, and stockholders) and the motivations, capabilities, interactions,

and information held and sought by the key players in the governance mosaic (which
include the board, audit committee, internal auditors, and external auditor). Since the
governance structure described above includes various levels of accountability, which
ultimately is intended to reside with external stakeholders, formal study of the effects of
accountability on the judgments of the various players is important to ensure effective
governance.
Agency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976) indicates that the agents (in this
case management) will not always act in the best interests of the principals, thus creating
a need for monitoring and accountability (see Cohen et al. 2008). Since most
shareholders cannot directly exercise this accountability, the board and its committees,
and the internal and external auditors, serve to ensure this accountability is established
and maintained. Through a complex formal and informal process, the interaction of the
board of directors, audit committee, internal audit function, external auditor, and
management attempts to create this accountability to the external stakeholders (see Cohen
et al. 2004). Corporate governance cannot be effective without this accountability;
therefore, is it critical to ensure it is established and maintained and does not serve as
only a ceremonial process, as suggested by institutional theory (Carcello et al. 2011;
Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2004).
DeZoort et al. (2006) examined the effects of accountability on external auditors’
behavior. The study builds on a line of external auditing research examining the effects of
accountability on auditor behavior (DeZoort et al. 2006, 6-7): “Collectively, these studies
generally indicate that accountability pressure decreases judgment variability (e.g.,
Ashton 1992; Johnson and Kaplan 1991) and increases judgment conservatism (e.g.,
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Hoffman and Patton 1997; Lord 1992) and effort (e.g., Asare et al. 2000; Chang et al.
1997; Cloyd 1997; Koonce et al. 1995; Tan 1995).” Of primary relevance to the present
study is the link between accountability and greater conservatism in judgments.
The DeZoort et al. (2006) study used a 4 X 2 between-subjects experiment
involving a series of materiality judgments. The participants were 160 external auditors
from five public accounting firms. The authors manipulated accountability pressure at
four levels: (1) anonymity, (2) review, (3) justification, and (4) feedback. They found that
incremental increases in levels of accountability of the external auditor through audit
partner review, justification, and feedback resulted in increased judgment conservatism,
decreased judgment variability, and increased levels of effort when performing planning
materiality and proposed audit adjustment tasks. The technical backgrounds, experiences,
and training of external auditors often are similar to those of internal auditors. In this
study, I expand this line of research to the context of reporting types and relationship
types of the internal auditor.
The literature on accountability theory regarding performance ratings from the
rater’s perspective is also relevant to this study, given that the primary responsibility of
the internal auditor is to provide feedback on the performance of an organization, its
management, and its internal controls. This places the internal auditor in the role of a
rater, similar to one in a performance-rating context. In this role as rater, the internal
auditor may make varying judgments depending on to whom he/she formally and
informally reports. Specifically, if the balance of reporting for the internal auditor resides
with management (a party that supports the reporting of favorable outcomes), the internal
auditor may feel pressure to report more favorable outcomes, resulting in lower quality
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ratings. If the balance of reporting resides with the audit committee (a party that supports
objective reporting), the internal auditor will be operating with no special pressures and
will provide higher quality ratings.
Academic research in this area demonstrates that raters who are held accountable
for their ratings in a motivational context in which there are no special pressures to
achieve a certain rating outcome will rate more accurately than raters in the same
motivation context who are not held accountable for their ratings (Mero and Motowidlo
1995). In addition, the extant literature provides evidence that accountable raters will rate
more consistently than will non-accountable raters. Prior research also provides evidence
that when individuals are required to document, report, and justify their ratings to higher
status or mixed status audiences, they provide more accurate ratings because they are
made to feel more accountable (Mero et al. 2007).
Based on accountability theory, both the lack of a report from the internal auditor
to the external stakeholders and the murky reporting relationship of the internal auditor
(oftentimes to senior management, who is supposed to be the subject of monitoring) tend
to reduce the level of accountability of the internal auditor to the ultimate beneficiaries of
corporate governance, the external stakeholders. These two existing conditions should
create stronger levels of accountability to management, as that is the group that receives
reports from the internal auditor and to whom the internal auditor often reports. In this
context, using accountability theory, the internal auditor will tend to make decisions and
judgments that are consistent with the views of the audience, which is management.
Given that internal auditors often have an unclear reporting relationship and in many
cases are accountable to management, they will be motivated to present themselves as
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positively as possible to this group and not properly maintain objectivity in their
assessment. When this occurs, the effectiveness of the player perhaps best positioned to
detect irregularities in the corporate governance mosaic, internal audit, is diminished. By
contrast, having internal audit issue reports to external stakeholders and having internal
audit report primarily to the audit committee instead of management both serve to
increase internal audit’s accountability to parties favoring more conservative judgments.
Hypotheses
Internal Audit Reports
Currently, the internal auditor does not document, report, or justify his/her ratings
to the external stakeholders. In this study, I apply accountability theory to the internal
audit reporting context. I posit that when internal auditors are required to document and
issue a written report to the external stakeholders, who would represent a higher status
audience, they may feel/experience greater accountability. Accountability theory predicts
that issuing an external report will motivate internal auditors to perform their role in a
manner that is more closely aligned with the interests of those external stakeholders, thus
resulting in more effective governance. Further, I posit that increasing the level of
accountability through variations in the content of the external report, should “cause”
internal auditors’ judgments to become more conservative. External stakeholders prefer
the controls and financial reporting process of the organization in which they have an
interest to be conservative (management does not cut corners and takes the governance
process seriously) in order to produce reliable and accurate information and to safeguard
assets (see Cohen et al. (2004) for discussion).
With respect to issuing an IAR to external stakeholders, internal audit
accountability to external stakeholders increases with the issuance of an activities-based
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IAR (what the IAF does) versus no external report. In providing descriptive information
to the external stakeholders, the IAF become more accountable to those stakeholders
because the function is now subject to review, scrutiny, and feedback. Likewise, an
assurance-based report (where the IAF provides a conclusion about internal control
effectiveness) reflects even greater accountability than an activities-based IAR. The
conclusion reached by the IAF increases the degree of review, scrutiny, and feedback the
IAF will encounter, thus increasing the degree of accountability. Finally, providing both
activities and assurance information in the IAR represents the highest level of
accountability in this study.
The two prime judgments presented to the participants were fraud risk
assessments and control risk assessments. While it may be expected that increased levels
of scrutiny would increase the level of internal audit accountability (and conservatism)
for all judgments, these two judgments are of particular interest due to the central role
they play in internal auditing and corporate governance. According to The Institute of
Internal Auditors’ 2010 Global Survey (IIA 2010b) (which included more than 13,500
respondents from more than 107 countries), investigation of fraud and evaluation of
internal controls were both listed within the top five activities performed by internal
auditors. In addition, these two judgments are related, as poor controls often lead to
increased risk of fraud (e.g., the fraud triangle) and would be of particular interest to a
variety of external stakeholders, who can suffer significant damages in fraud cases (e.g.,
Beasley et al. 2010).
Based on the discussion above, the first set of hypotheses uses accountability
theory to predict the effect of report type as follows (collectively, internal auditor
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conservatism is predicted to increase across the levels of (a) no report, to (b) activitiesbased IAR, to (c) assurance-based IAR, to (d) activities-based and assurance-based IAR):
Hypothesis 1A:
Internal auditors issuing a descriptive activities-based internal audit report to
external stakeholders will make more conservative judgments when performing
fraud and control risk assessments than internal auditors issuing no such report.
Hypothesis 1B:
Internal auditors issuing an assurance-based internal audit report to external
stakeholders will make more conservative judgments when performing fraud and
control risk assessments than internal auditors issuing a descriptive activitiesbased report.
Hypothesis 1C:
Internal auditors issuing a descriptive activities-based and assurance-based
internal audit report to external stakeholders will make more conservative
judgments when performing fraud and control risk assessments than internal
auditors issuing an assurance-based report.
Reporting Channel
Accountability theory also provides a basis for expecting internal audit’s reporting
channel (primarily to the audit committee or primarily to management) to affect internal
auditors’ judgments. When decision makers know their audience’s views, they make
decisions or judgments that are consistent with those views (Klimoski and Inks 1990;
Tetlock 1985), because as cognitive misers (Taylor and Fisk 1978), people prefer
decision-making strategies that involve the least effort. Several studies have supported
the influence of the need for approval (Jones and Wortman 1977; Workman and
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Lisenmeier 1977) and the motivation of individuals to present themselves as positively as
possible to those to whom they are accountable (Baumeister 1982; Schlenker 1980).
In serving in their role as an evaluator of the performance of management, the
internal audit function typically reports jointly to management and the audit committee
(Abbott et al. 2010). This situation may affect internal auditors’ rating accuracy, since
internal auditors (raters) are not held accountable for their ratings to the ultimate
beneficiary (the external stakeholder) but are operating in a motivational context in which
there are special pressures to achieve a certain ratings outcome from management.
Agency theory states that the role of the corporate governance actors (i.e., board
of directors, audit committee, internal auditor) is to monitor management to prevent
opportunistic management behavior (Cohen et al. 2008; Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Thus, it is the role of the audit committee to support judgments that ensure proper
financial statement reporting and disclosure. Consistent with this role, Haka and Chalos
(1990) found that audit committees support a higher level of disclosure to external
stakeholders than does management. DeZoort (1997) found that the audit committees
indicated that the evaluation of internal control was the most important duty for the
committee to fulfill. Effective internal controls are designed to ensure accurate financial
reporting and reduce the risk of fraud. Abbott and Parker (2000) discussed that audit
committees have a motivation to avoid financial misstatements to protect the reputational
capital of their members. In addition, the audit committee is subject to potential director
liability if financial statement fraud is to occur. All of the above studies support the audit
committee’s preference for conservative judgments relating to financial statement
reporting and fraud prevention.
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In addition, audit committees of public companies are required to include a report
to external stakeholders in the annual proxy statement. According to the SEC, this report
must include the following (SEC 2000):
…in

the report, the audit committee must state whether the audit committee has:

(i)
reviewed and discussed the audited financial statements with management; (ii)
discussed with the independent auditors the matters required to be discussed by
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, as may be modified or supplemented;
and (iii) received from the auditors disclosures regarding the auditors'
independence required by Independence Standards Board Standard No. 1, as may
be modified or supplemented, and discussed with the auditors the auditors'
independence
This requirement may further bolster the accountability of the audit committee to the
external stakeholders and cause the audit committee to favor conservative judgments.
When the internal auditor primarily reports to the audit committee chair and less
so to management, under accountability theory, the internal auditor will make decisions
that support the preferences of the audit committee chair, who favors more conservative
judgments. The audit committee favors more conservative judgments to protect the
members’ reputation risk of having improper actions taken by management, avoid
potential personal liability, and fulfill its responsibility to ensure proper financial
reporting (see DeZoort et al. 2008). In addition, the annual report issued by the audit
committee to the external stakeholders may increase the audit committee’s accountability
to the external stakeholders.
In terms of the reporting channel within the organization, if the internal auditor is
more closely aligned with the audit committee chair, a governance entity, than with
management, internal auditor judgments should be more consistent with a conservative
governance focus, which aligns with both accountability theory and agency theory. If the
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internal auditor is more closely aligned with management, the internal auditor’s
judgments should be more consistent with management’s views (less conservative). The
second hypothesis applies accountability theory to predict the effect of reporting
relationship type on internal auditor’s judgments as follows:
Hypothesis 2:
Internal auditors primarily reporting to the audit committee chair will make more
conservative judgments when performing fraud and control risk assessments than
internal auditors primarily reporting to management.
Research Questions
The study also includes survey questions to gather perception data from the
internal auditors regarding the potential costs and benefits of issuing IARs. In addition,
the instrument gathers data as to where the participants’ actual internal audit function
reports so as to gain insights into the current balance of reporting and to determine if the
actual reporting relationship has an effect on the responses in the study. The research
questions related to this survey include:
1. What is the level of IAF support for the issuance of an activities-based IAR to
external stakeholders?
a. What are the perceived advantages and disadvantages to issuing such a report?
b. What would be the perceived cost of issuing such a report?
2. What is the level of IAF support for the issuance of an assurance-based IAR to
external stakeholders?
a. What are the perceived advantages and disadvantages to issuing such a report?
b. What would be the perceived cost of issuing such a report?
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3. Where does the balance of reporting for oversight currently reside within the
respondents’ IAFs?
4. Where does the balance of reporting for budget determination currently reside for
the respondents’ IAFs?
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Experimental Design and Case Development
The experimental materials were composed of an informed consent, followed by a
brief case study that included sections for company and industry background, financial
performance, management and compensation, audit committee and external auditor, and
internal controls, with 8 different versions – for each of the 4 report types and each of the
2 relationship types (4 x 2 between-subjects design).
The base case materials represented a mid-sized public company that has a
competent management team and historically has an effective governance structure and
results that are in line with industry performance. In addition, the company historically
had clean audit opinions on its financial statements from a reputable external audit firm
(the company is not an accelerated filer, so there is no external audit opinion on internal
control over financial reporting2), and management compensation is comparable with
industry benchmarks.
The initial case materials were developed after performing a comprehensive
review of the accounting literature on the topics of IAF report types (e.g., Holt and
DeZoort 2009; Archambeault et al. 2008) and reporting relationship types (e.g., Abbott et
al. 2010; Beasley et al. 2009). In addition, I reviewed relevant best practices and guidance
from The IIA and publicly filed external audit reports. My dissertation committee
reviewed these initial case materials. Feedback was provided and incorporated into the
2

This design characteristic makes the IAF’s role more prominent and avoids confounding with a report
from the external auditor under SOX Section 404 (b).

materials. In addition, four other academics with expertise in the area (including one who
is very active in The IIA and has significant experience in practice) took the instrument
and provided valuable feedback, which was incorporated into the final version of the
cases.
The most significant feedback provided related to the ensuring that the
manipulations were reasonable and would be understandable to practitioners, since some
of the conditions contained concepts and ideas that are not consistent with current
practice. For example, the notion of the internal audit function providing various reports
to external stakeholders is currently not found in practice. Since an IAR does not exist,
extensive design work needed to be performed to select the scope, foundation, format,
and content for such a report. In order to accomplish this task, research was performed on
current internal audit reports (issued internally), including the reporting standards and
guidelines set by The Institute of Internal Auditors, as well as a review of the various
reports and requirements for external auditor reporting. I also adapted material from
Archambeault et al. (2008) related to activities-based reports.
Table 1 summarizes the 4 x 2 design that used four levels of internal audit report
and two levels of internal audit reporting relationship. This design creates eight cells.
Similar studies in accounting have secured approximately 15 responses per cell (e.g.,
DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b). In this study, the goal was to secure approximately 15
completed instruments per cell, for a total of approximately 120 participants (see the
Results section for discussion of power and effect size).
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TABLE 1
4 X 2 Experimental Design and Expected Cell Sizes

Relationship Type 1
Head of IAF
effectively reports to
senior management
(CFO)
Relationship Type 2
Head of IAF
effectively reports to
the AC chair

Report Type 1
No IAR
(represents the
current
practice)

Report Type 2
Internal auditors
issue a descriptive
activities-based
internal audit
report to external
stakeholders

Report Type 3
Internal auditors
issue an
assurance-based
internal audit
report to external
stakeholders

15 participants

15 participants

15 participants

Report Type 4
Internal auditors
issue a
descriptive
activities-based
and assurancebased internal
audit report to
external
stakeholders
15 participants

15 participants

15 participants

15 participants

15 participants

The online instrument was designed and administered in Qualtrics and was
accessed by invited participants via an online link that was sent to them in an email
request. The participants were active senior level internal audit professionals. I initially
used the Atlanta Chapter of The IIA, which is a very large chapter (approximately 1,200
members) and later included two smaller chapters of The IIA (approximately 500
members for both) to reach the required number of participants. The IIA sent the
experiment link along with a request letter via email. In total, three requests (included the
initial one) were sent to the participants. Please see Appendices 1 for samples of request
emails. The instrument included a total of 46 items; however, each participant was
presented only a subset of those items depending on the cell to which they were randomly
assigned (see Appendices 2).
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The instrument was submitted to the Institutional Review Boards at the University
of Scranton, Kennesaw State University, and The University of Alabama. Feedback from
these boards was incorporated into the instrument, and the final version was approved.
Experimental Task
The participants were first provided the informed consent, followed by the base
case information. All participants were required to acknowledge acceptance of the
informed consent in order to continue with the instrument. The participants were then
randomly assigned to one of the two reporting relationships and presented with that
information. Next, one of the four report types was randomly presented.
After reading the report type, the participants were all presented the same
information regarding a system conversion and the related results of interim control
testing performed by the internal audit department. These results indicated a higher than
expected error rate in a key control in the revenue cycle.
The participants were then asked to make six judgments, all of which represent
dependent variables (fraud risk assessment and control risk assessment, which are the
primary dependent variables; followed by testing hours, justification to the CFO,
experience level of staff, and comfort level with the CFO, which are secondary dependent
variables that are examined in an additional analysis section). The participants were then
asked to complete two manipulation check questions (one for the relationship type
manipulation and one for the report type manipulation), followed by questions to assess
how realistic and understandable the case was, their support level and related cost
estimate for the various report types, demographic and control data, and to what degree
they report in practice to management and the audit committee in their organizations. The

31

instrument ended with an invitation to participate in a gift card drawing. The flow of the
Qualtrics instrument is outlined in Table 2 on the following page.
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TABLE 2
Instrument Flow
Instructions and Informed Consent
Base Case Information
Reporting Relationship
Manipulation 2:
Primarily Report to the AC

Reporting Relationship
Manipulation 1:
Primarily Report to the CFO
Report
Type 1:
No
Report

Report
Type 2:
Descriptive
Report

Report
Type 3:
Assurance
Report

Report
Type 4:
Descriptive
/Assurance

Report
Type 1:
No
Report

System Conversion & Related
Internal Audit Interim Control
Testing Results
Fraud Risk Judgment
Control Risk Judgment
Testing Hours Judgment
Justification to CFO Judgment
Experience Level Judgment
Comfort Level to CFO
Judgment
Manipulation Checks
Survey Question – Realistic and
Understandable
Survey Question – Support and
Cost of Report Types
Demographic and Control Data

Survey Questions – Who They
Report to in Practice
Invitation to Drawing
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Report
Type 2:
Descriptive
Report

Report
Type 3:
Assurance
Report

Report
Type 4:
Descriptive
/Assurance

The two primary judgment tasks were a fraud risk assessment and a control risk
assessment, fundamental assessments of the risks considered by the internal auditor. The
fraud risk assessment question instructed the participants to indicate their opinion as to
the level of financial statement fraud risk associated with the revenue cycle for the given
fiscal year, based only on the information presented in the case. The control risk question
instructed the participants to indicate their opinion as to the level of control risk
associated with the revenue cycle for the given fiscal year, based only on the information
presented in the case. These judgments were measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0
represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, and 100 represents high risk). This type
of scale is common for these types of studies in the accounting literature (e.g., DeZoort et
al. 2003a, 2003b, 2008).
In terms of the secondary judgments, the judgment made by the participants for
the testing hours was measured on a sliding scale from -50 to 50 (-50 represents
significantly fewer hours this year, 0 represents the same amount of hours, and 50
represents significantly more hours this year). The question instructed the participants to
indicate how many hours they would expect to spend on the revenue cycle control
testing during the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal year-end
audit. The judgment made by the participants for the importance of justification to the
CFO was measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents not at all important, 50
represents moderately important, and 100 represents very important). The question
instructed the participants to indicate how important it would be to justify to the Chief
Financial Officer the audit hours they have budgeted to audit internal control over the
revenue cycle.
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The judgment made by the participants for the experience level of assigned staff
was measured on a sliding scale from -50 to 50 (-50 represents significantly less
experience this year, 0 represents the same amount of experience, and 50 represents
significantly more experience this year). The question instructed the participants to
indicate the experience level of the staff they would assign to the revenue cycle control
testing for the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal year-end
audit.
The judgment made by the participants for the comfort level of reporting the
control testing findings to the CFO was measured on a sliding scale from -50 to 50 (-50
represents very uncomfortable, 0 represents neutral, and 50 represents very
comfortable). The question instructed the participants to indicate how comfortable they
would be in reporting the preliminary internal control deficiency findings (18%
exceptions) to the Chief Financial Officer.
Finally, sliding scales from 0 – 100 (0 represents very unrealistic/very difficult to
understand, 50 represents moderately realistic/understandable, and 100 represents very
realistic/understandable) were used to measure how realistic and understandable the case
was to the participants.
Independent Variables
The study includes independent variables for the various report types (REPORT
TYPE) and relationship types (REPORTING RELATIONSHIP). The report types
include four levels of internal audit reports:
Type 1 (NO REPORT):
No formal reporting from the internal auditor to the public (external
stakeholders). This represents the existing state in practice today.
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Type 2 (DESCRIPTIVE REPORT):
A written report from the internal auditor to the public describing the
composition, responsibilities, and activities of the IAF as described in
Archambeault et al. (2008). As part of the reporting process, this report is
to be presented, discussed, and scrutinized by the audit committee prior to
its presentation to the public. This report is currently not used in practice.
This report represents an increased level of internal audit accountability
from Type 1 to both the external stakeholders and the audit committee.
Type 3 (ASSURANCE REPORT):
A written report from the internal auditor to the public including
describing certain assurances from the internal auditor on internal control
effectiveness. These assurances are similar to the ones provided by the
company CFO and CEO under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302. As
part of the reporting process, this report is to be presented, discussed, and
scrutinized by the audit committee prior to its presentation to the public.
This report is currently not used in practice. This report represents an
increased level of internal audit accountability from Type 2 to both the
external stakeholders and the audit committee.
Type 4 (DESCRIPTIVE AND ASSURANCE REPORT):
A written report from the internal auditor to the public describing the
composition, responsibilities, and activities of the IAF as described in
Archambeault et al. (2008). In addition, the report includes certain
assurances from the internal auditor on internal control effectiveness.
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These assurances are similar to the ones provided by the company CFO
and CEO under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302. As part of the
reporting process, this report is to be presented, discussed, and scrutinized
by the audit committee prior to its presentation to the public. This report is
currently not used in practice. This report will represent an increased level
of internal auditor accountability from Type 3 to both the external
stakeholders and the audit committee.
The study includes two IAF reporting relationship types, each representing
independent variables in the model as follows:
Type 1 (ACCOUNTABLE SENIOR MANGEMENT):
The head of the IAF has a formal reporting relationship with the Audit
Committee Chair (ACC) and senior management (specifically the CFO)
with the CFO taking a much more active role than the ACC. This
reporting relationship type includes the dual reporting structure as
described in the Institute of Internal Auditors’ best practices (IIA 2010a);
however, the much more active CFO oversight role is not consistent with
the recommended guidance. This type of oversight role for the CFO has
been identified to exist in practice as discussed in Beasley et al. (2009).
The head of the IAF discussed topics with the CFO on a frequent
basis and receives feedback and direction on the scope, timing, and
management of the IAF. Prior to the ACC’s formal approval of the
charter, risk assessment, and audit plan for the internal audit department,
the CFO reviews these materials and provides feedback and an informal
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approval. The head of the IAF provides direct communication to the CFO
on the results of the internal audit activities or other matters determined to
be necessary, including in private meetings. In addition, the head of the
IAF meets with the CFO in preparation for the quarterly audit committee
meetings.
The CFO can significantly influence the head of the IAF’s annual
performance rating, compensation adjustment, and future career
advancement within the organization. The annual budget for the IAF is
largely shaped by discussions between the head of the IAF and the CFO.
The CFO and ACC also discuss the head of the IAF’s performance and
internal budget with each other, ultimately leading to formal audit
committee approval.
The head of the IAF discusses topics with the ACC on a quarterly
basis, primarily related to the audit committee meeting. In preparation for
these meetings, the CAE and the ACC discuss the key activities performed
by the internal audit function since the last meeting and any related
findings that are deemed material. In practice, the ACC primarily acts as a
point person between the internal audit department and the audit
committee.
Type 2 (ACCOUNTABLE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR):
The head of the IAF truly reports to the audit committee chair and works
closely with this person throughout the year. This report more closely
reflects the key components noted in the Institute of Internal Auditors’
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best practice reporting structure (IIA 2010a). In this relationship type, the
head of the IAF has a reporting relationship with the ACC and the CFO,
with the ACC taking a much more active oversight role than the CFO. It
was important to include the dual reporting component in both relationship
types to make the case consistent with the Institute of Internal Auditors’
best practice reporting structure and what occurs in practice.
The head of the IAF discusses topics with the ACC on a frequent
basis and receives feedback and direction on the scope, nature, timing, and
management of the activities of the IAF. The ACC approves the charter,
risk assessment, and audit plan for the IAF. The head of the IAF provides
direct communication to the ACC on the results of the IAF activities or
other matters determined to be necessary, including in private meetings. In
addition, the head of the IAF meets with the ACC in preparation for and
during the quarterly audit committee meetings.
The ACC ultimately determines the annual performance rating,
compensation adjustment, and future career advancement of the
participant within the organization. The annual budget for the IAF is based
on discussions between the head of the IAF and the ACC. The ACC may
solicit feedback from the CFO to aid in the assessment of the head of the
IAF’s performance and the determination of the internal audit function’s
budget.
The head of the IAF discusses topics with the CFO on quarterly
basis. During this discussion, the head of the IAF communicates to the
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CFO the direction and support needed from the finance function to
execute the IAF annual audit plan. In practice, the CFO primarily acts as
an administrative point person between the IAF and the finance
organization.
In addition to the manipulated independent variables, I consider several potential
control variables, including participants’ gender, years of professional experience, years
of experience as an internal auditor, title, certification status (CIA, CPA, CMA, and
CFE), educational status, industry, company size, and perceptions of the case.
Dependent Variables
In this study, I use two primary dependent variables and four additional secondary
variables. The two primary variables are complex tasks that represent a significant degree
of judgment and are at the core of internal audit’s responsibilities (IIA 2010b). These
variables are of central interest to the study and are a fraud risk assessment and a control
risk assessment. The secondary variables encompass tasks of interest; however, they do
not reflect the same degree of judgment or complexity as the primary variables and are
included in the study to gain additional insights into the primary complex judgments.
Primary Variable 1: Fraud risk assessment (FRAUD RISK)
The participants were asked to assess the risk related to a potential fraud
occurring at the company in the revenue cycle as follows:
Based only on the information presented in the case materials,
please slide the below bar to indicate your opinion as to the level
of financial statement fraud risk associated with the revenue cycle
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for this fiscal year (0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate
risk, and 100 represents high risk).
Primary Variable 2: Control risk assessment (CONTROL RISK)
The participants were asked to assess the risk of in the internal controls
not detecting a material error in the revenue cycle as follows:
Based only on the information presented in the case materials,
please slide the below bar to indicate your opinion as to the level
of control risk associated with the revenue cycle for this fiscal year
(0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, and 100
represents high risk).
Secondary Variable 1: Control testing hours (TESTING HOURS)
The participants were asked to assess how many hours of control testing
they would budget to perform compared with the prior year budget as
follows:
Based only on the information presented in the case materials,
please slide the below bar to indicate how many hours would you
expect to spend on the revenue cycle control testing during
the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal
year-end audit (-50 represents significantly fewer hours this year, 0
represents the same amount of hours, and 50 represents
significantly more hours this year).
Secondary Variable 2: Level of justification to the CFO (CFO JUSTIFICATION)

41

The participants were asked to assess how important it would be for them
to justify the hours they budgeted to the CFO as follows:
Based only on the information presented in the case materials,
please slide the below bar to indicate how important it would be to
justify to the Chief Financial Officer the audit hours you have
budgeted to audit internal control over the revenue cycle (0
represents not at all important, 50 represents moderately important,
and 100 represents very important).
Secondary Variable 3: Experience level of assigned staff (STAFF
EXPERIENCE)
The participants were asked to assess what level of experience they would
assign to the control testing as follows:
Based only on the information presented in the case materials,
please slide the below bar to indicate the experience level of the
staff you would assign to the revenue cycle control testing
for the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior
fiscal year-end audit (-50 represents significantly less
experience this year, 0 represents the same amount of experience,
and 50 represents significantly more experience this year).
Secondary Variable 4: Comfort level with the CFO (CFO COMFORT)
The participants were asked to assess how comfortable they would be in
reporting the preliminary audit findings to the CFO as follows:

42

Based only on the information presented in the case materials,
please slide the below bar to indicate how comfortable you
would be in reporting the preliminary internal control deficiency
findings (18% exceptions) to the Chief Financial Officer (-50
represents very uncomfortable, 0 represents neutral, and 50
represents very comfortable).
Control Variables
In this study, I consider several potential covariates and fixed effects that may
serve as control variables, including (coding details for variables actually used are
discussed further in the Results section below):
Gender (dummy variable).
Total Professional Experience (measured in years).
Professional Experience as an Internal Auditor (measured in
years).
Title (categorical variable for different titles).
Industry Segment (consulting, government, public accounting,
public company, private for profit, not for profit, other) (dummy
variables).
Revenue of Company (categories based on revenues in dollars).
Professional Certifications (CPA, CIA, CFA, CFE, CMA) (dummy
variables).
Education (dummy variables for different levels).
Realistic Case (0 – 100 scale).
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Understandable Case (0 – 100 scale).
Model
Based on the above discussion of independent, dependent, and control variables, I
use the following MANCOVA model to test my hypotheses (followed by individual
ANCOVAs for fraud risk and control risk separately):
(FRAUD RISK, CONTROL RISK) = f (REPORT TYPE1, REPORTING
RELATIONSHIP TYPE2, REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE,
Control Variables3)
1

NO REPORT, DESCRIPTIVE REPORT, ASSURANCE REPORT,

DESCRIPTIVE AND ASSURANCE REPORT
2

ACCOUNTABLE CFO, ACCOUNTABLE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR

3

I consider variables including GENDER, TOTAL EXPERIENCE, INTERNAL

AUDIT EXPERIENCE, TITLE, INDUSTRY SEGMENT, REVENUE,
CERTIFICATIONS, EDUCATION, REALISTIC, UNDERSTANDABLE.
Survey Questions
After the experiment was concluded, the study included a series of survey
questions. These questions provide additional insight into the topic of reporting
relationships and report types as they relate to the internal auditor. In addition, the
questions provide practical insights, such as those related to implementation and cost of
IARs. The questions include:
1. Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual
written report to external stakeholders that includes descriptive
information about the internal audit function such as its composition,
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responsibilities, accountability, activities, and resources. Please
indicate by sliding the bar below, your personal level of support for
such an external report (0 represents no support, 50 represents
moderate support, and 100 represents full support).
a. Measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.
b. Please explain your rationale.
2. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it
would cost for your internal audit department to issue an annual report
to external stakeholders that provides descriptive information about the
internal audit function such as its composition, responsibilities,
accountability, activities, and resources. (Please state the cost estimate
as a percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).
a. Measured using a sliding scale from 0% to 300%.3
3. Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual
written report to external stakeholders that provides positive assurance
on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically
deemed to be material and of higher risk. Please indicate by sliding the
bar below, your personal level of support for such an external report (0
represents no support, 50 represents moderate support, and 100
represents full support).
a. Measured using a sliding scale from 0 to 100.
b. Please explain your rationale.
3

The 300% endpoint for the scale was determined based on feedback from an academic reviewer with
significant experience in the practice of internal auditing. This was an increase from the original endpoint
of 100% to recognize the possibility of a very large effect on the IAF budget.
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4. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it
would cost for your internal audit department to issue an annual report
to external stakeholders that provides positive assurance on the
effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically deemed
to be material and of higher risk. (Please state the cost estimate as a
percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).
a. Measured using a sliding scale from 0% to 300%.
5. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, the degree to which
management and the audit committee actively oversee the
Internal Audit Department in your organization (0 represents oversight
is provided almost exclusively by management, 50 represents equal
oversight by management and the audit committee, and 100 represents
oversight is provided almost exclusively by the audit committee).
a. Measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.
6. Please indicate by sliding the bar below, which group has the
greatest influence over the determination of the Internal Audit
Department’s budget in your organization (0 represents it is almost
exclusively influenced by management, 50 represents it is
equally influenced by management and the audit committee, and 100
represents it is almost exclusively influenced by the audit committee).
a. Measured on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.
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Participants
The study’s participants were active senior level internal audit professionals. I
initially used the Atlanta Chapter of The IIA, which is a very large chapter
(approximately 1,200 members) and later included two smaller chapters of The IIA
(approximately 500 members for both) to reach the required number of participants.
Since this study required the participants to make some complex judgments, I needed to
ensure the population primarily included participants with a high level of experience
(e.g., typically 5 plus years). The IIA sent the experiment to the following groups from
their membership database:
Chief Audit Executives,
Directors of Auditing,
Audit Managers,
Audit Staff,
IT Audit Directors,
IT Audit Managers,
IT Audit Staff,
Corporate Management, and
Audit Committee Members.4
The individuals in these groups were sent an email invitation to participate in the
study from the President of their related IIA chapter. In total, three requests (included the
initial one) were sent to the participants. Please see Exhibit I for samples of request
emails. As of January 18, 2012, I received 152 fully completed experiments, resulting in

4

Audit staff, IT audit staff, corporate management, and audit committee members are not part of our main
target group, and we had very few usable responses from such individuals (n = 10). As noted below,
respondent title and years of internal audit experience are not associated with the dependent variables. In
addition, if I delete all observations with such “other titles” or no title indicated, the MANCOVA results (n
= 96) are consistent with those in Table 8 below, except that PUBLIC COMPANY becomes significant (p
= 0.0292).
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a response rate of 13% (which is comparable to other online instruments sent to internal
auditors, e.g., Beasley et al. (2005)). The mean completion time for the experiment was
45.1 minutes. The fully completed responses for each of the eight cells in the 4 X 2
experimental design are shown in Table 3 below:
TABLE 3
Fully Completed Experiments

Relationship Type 1
Head of IAF
effectively reports to
senior management
(CFO)
Relationship Type 2
Head of IAF
effectively reports to
the AC chair

Report Type 1
No IAR
(represents the
current
practice)

Report Type 2
Internal auditors
issue a descriptive
activities-based
internal audit
report to external
stakeholders

Report Type 3
Internal auditors
issue an
assurance-based
internal audit
report to external
stakeholders

21 participants

15 participants

16 participants

Report Type 4
Internal auditors
issue a
descriptive
activities-based
and assurancebased internal
audit report to
external
stakeholders
30 participants

17 participants

16 participants

14 participants

23 participants
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Manipulation Checks
All of the 152 participants were asked two multiple-choice questions to evaluate
the effectiveness of the manipulations in the case. The first question focused on the
reporting relationship manipulation as follows:
Q23 – Manipulation Check – Reporting Relationship
In this case, who most actively oversees the Internal Audit Department?
 Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
 Audit Committee Chair (ACC)
The second question focused on the report type manipulation as follows:
Q24 – Manipulation Check – Report Type
In this case, your Internal Audit Department produces the following voluntary
(not required) reports to external stakeholders:
 No reporting to external stakeholders – all internal audit reports are for
internal use only.
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes only
descriptive information about the internal audit function.
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that provides only
positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have
historically deemed to be material and of higher risk.
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes both
descriptive information about the internal audit function and provides positive
assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have
historically deemed to be material and of higher risk.
The response choices for both questions were randomized for each participant.
Out of the total of 152 completed experiments, nine failed the reporting relationship

manipulation check (5.9%) and 35 failed the report type manipulation check (23%). This
rate of failure is consistent with some accounting studies targeting high-level participants
(e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b, 2008). An investigation of the 35 report type failures
revealed that five (represents 3.3% of the total completed experiments) of them were
related to the participant selecting the report type 1 (no IAR report) condition when they
were presented one of the IAR report conditions (type 2, 3, and 4) or vice versa. The 30
remaining errors (19.7% of the total completed experiments) related to participants who
were presented one of the IAR report conditions and incorrectly selected a different IAR
report condition. This suggests that the failure rate may be attributable to the fact that
IARs to external stakeholders are not used in practice, and the participants were very
likely to be unfamiliar with externally-issued IARs before reading the case materials.
Thus, one could expect some degree of difficulty in understanding the report types. After
eliminating both the reporting relationships and the report type manipulation checks
failures, 108 participants were left for analysis.5
Table 4 shown below summarizes the number of participants who completed the
instrument and passed all manipulation checks. The number of responses for each cell is
consistent with some previous studies in accounting (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b),
but see below for additional discussion of power and effect size.

5

If I run the MANCOVA on the full sample (n = 151 due to one incomplete response), the results are
consistent with those presented in Table 8 below, except that REPORT TYPE (p = 0.3517) and
REALISTIC (p = 0.1994) are no longer significant. The insignificance of REPORT TYPE appears
reasonable given that 35 participants failed the report type manipulation check question.

50

TABLE 4
Fully Completed and Passed All Manipulation Checks

Relationship Type 1
Head of IAF
effectively reports to
senior management
(CFO)
Relationship Type 2
Head of IAF
effectively reports to
the AC chair

Report Type 1
No IAR
(represents the
current
practice)

Report Type 2
Internal auditors
issue a descriptive
activities-based
internal audit
report to external
stakeholders

Report Type 3
Internal auditors
issue an
assurance-based
internal audit
report to external
stakeholders

15 participants

13 participants

12 participants

Report Type 4
Internal auditors
issue a
descriptive
activities-based
and assurancebased internal
audit report to
external
stakeholders
17 participants

12 participants

14 participants

13 participants

12 participants

In summary, approximately 1,200 individuals were invited to participate in the
experiment; 286 elected to participate and were presented the reporting relationship
manipulation (142 were presented the CFO version and 144 the ACC version). After
completing that manipulation, 281 continued taking the experiment and were presented
the report manipulation (68 were presented the no IAR version, 77 the descriptive IAR,
72 the assurance IAR, and 64 the descriptive and assurance IAR). The participants
continued with the experiment, with 152 fully completing the instrument and 108 fully
completing the instrument and passing both manipulation checks. The results and
analyses that follow are based on the sample of 108 participants that passed the
manipulation checks.
Participants’ Perceptions of the Case
Two questions were used to assess the participants’ perceptions of case realism
and understandability. Based on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 represents very unrealistic,
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50 represents moderately realistic, and 100 represents very realistic), the participants
found the case to be realistic (mean of REALISTIC = 76.77, SD of 18.54; only one
participant scored lower than 25 and five scored lower than 50). Based on a sliding scale
from 0-100 (0 represents very difficult to understand, 50 represents moderately
understandable, and 100 represents very understandable), participants found the case to
be understandable (mean of UNDERSTANDABLE = 85.91, SD of 14.05; no participants
scored lower than 50). Both the means are significantly higher than the scale midpoint of
50 (p < 0.001). In addition, one-way ANOVAs indicate no significant differences in
REALISTIC (p = 0.5475) or UNDERSTANDABLE (p = 0.5015) across the eight case
versions.
Demographics
Demographic information for the 108 participants is shown in Table 5 below. The
participants were almost equally split between male (49.1 percent) and female (50.1
percent) and were very experienced (83.3 percent had over 10 years of professional
experience, and 58.3 percent had over 10 years of internal audit experience). The
participants typically held high level titles (67.6 percent held titles of Manager or higher
in the IAF) and represented organizations of varying size and business segments (with the
majority working for companies with more than $1 billion in revenues). The participants
held numerous professional certifications (82.4 percent held at least one certification),
with the CIA (58.3 percent) and CPA (57.4 percent) designations being the most
predominant. The participants were well educated (many held some form of an advanced
degree).
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TABLE 5
Demographic Information
Gender

Male

52

49.1%

Female

54

50.9%

6

5.6%

Total Years of

<5

Professional Experience

5 – 10

12

11.1%

11 – 15

18

16.7%

16 – 20

20

18.5%

21 – 25

16

14.8%

> 25

36

33.3%

6

13.0%

Years of Professional

<5

Experience in Internal Audit

5 – 10

31

28.7%

11 – 15

23

21.3%

16 – 20

16

14.8%

21 – 25

9

8.3%

> 25

15

13.9%

Chief Audit Executive

21

19.4%

Director of Internal Audit

32

29.7%

Manager of Internal Audit

20

18.5%

Accounting/Consulting Firm Partner
Accounting/Consulting Firm Senior
Manager

5

4.6%

1

0.9%

Accounting/Consulting Firm Manager

1

0.9%

16

14.8%

Information Technology Auditor

2

1.9%

Senior Business Analyst

2

1.9%

Other

8

7.4%

Consulting

7

6.5%

14

13.0%

1

0.9%

Public Company

49

45.4%

Private For-Profit Company

24

22.2%

6

5.6%

14

13.0%

Current Title

14

Senior Internal Auditor

Business Segment

Government
Public Accounting

Not-For-Profit
Other

6

If these 14 participants are deleted, the results of the MANCOVA in Table 8 are unaffected, except that
PUBLIC COMPANY has p = 0.234.
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Annual Revenue

Professional Certifications

Educational Status

Less than $10 million

4

3.8%

$10 million to $50 million

5

4.7%

$51 million to $100 million

4

3.8%

$101 million to $200 million

7

6.6%

$201 million to $300 million

3

2.8%

$301 million to $400 million

3

2.8%

$401 million to $500 million

9

8.5%

$501 million to $1 billion

15

14.2%

Over $1 billion

56

52.8%

CIA

63

58.3%

CFA

3

2.8%

CFE

15

13.9%

CMA

3

2.8%

CPA

62

57.4%

None

19

17.6%

Undergraduate Degree in Accounting

64

59.3%

Other Undergraduate Degree

26

24.1%

MBA

35

32.4%

Masters in Accountancy

18

16.7%

Masters in Taxation

1

0.9%

Other Masters Degree

8

7.4%

Doctoral Degree in Accounting

2

1.9%

Other Doctoral Degree

0

0.0%

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the primary dependent variables (fraud risk assessment
and control risk assessment) are shown in Table 6. Using one-way ANOVAs (as shown
in Table 7), the differences between the means are analyzed and discussed below.
Fraud Risk Assessment
Using a one-way ANOVA, the fraud risk assessment means for the report type
condition (no IAR type 1 mean of 64.70, descriptive IAR type 2 mean of 70.78,
assurance IAR type 3 mean of 78.72, and descriptive and assurance type 4 mean of
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74.93) were different with marginal significance (F = 2.14, p = 0.0995), justifying further
investigation using t-tests.
Using two sample t-tests (not tabulated), there were significant differences
between report type 1 and report type 3 (p = 0.0092), and report type 1 and report type 4
(p = 0.0277). A marginally significant difference between report type 2 and report type 3
(p = 0.0948) was also found. No significant differences were found between report type 1
and report type 2 (p = 0.1997), report type 2 and report type 4 (p = 0.2193), and report
type 3 and report type 4 (p = 0.7922). Overall, these univariate results are partially
consistent with Hypotheses 1A – 1C; however, multivariate testing has not yet been
performed.
The fraud risk assessment means for the relationship type conditions (CFO – type
1 mean of 68.65 and ACC type 2 mean of 76.73) were significantly different (F = 4.58, p
= 0.0346), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Control Risk Assessment
The control risk assessment means for the report type conditions (no IAR type 1
mean of 83.11, descriptive IAR type 2 mean of 87.93, assurance IAR type 3 mean of
87.08, and descriptive and assurance type 4 mean of 82.90) were not significantly
different (F = 1.20, p = 0.3135), inconsistent with H1A – H1C. The control risk
assessment means for the relationship type condition (CFO type 1 mean of 81.51 and
ACC type 2 mean of 89.27) were significantly different (F = 11.37, p = .0010), which is
consistent with Hypothesis 2.
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TABLE 6
Descriptive Statistics

Report Type 1
No External
Report
Report Type 2
Descriptive
Report
Report Type 3
Assurance
Report
Report Type 4
Descriptive and
Assurance Report
Relationship Type 1
Chief Financial
Officer
Relationship Type 2
Audit Committee
Chair

Fraud
Risk
27
64.70
19.82
27
70.78
23.88
25
78.72
19.62
29
74.93
15.30
57
68.65
18.72
51
76.73
20.50

n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D.

Control
Risk
27
83.11
13.38
27
87.93
8.74
25
87.08
13.32
29
82.90
13.75
57
81.51
13.04
51
89.27
10.59

TABLE 7
One-way ANOVAs

Report
Type
Relationship
Type

Fraud Risk
Assessment
2.14
0.0995
4.58
0.0346

F-statistic
p-value
F-statistic
p-value

Control Risk
Assessment
1.2
0.3135
11.37
0.001

MANCOVA Results
The model used in the study included multiple dependent variables (FRAUD
RISK, CONTROL RISK) that are correlated (r = 0.4683, p < 0.001), as well as
independent variables that include both continuous and nominal variables. As a result, I
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used MANCOVA to assess the overall relationships. Prior research does not provide
clear insights as to what variables should be included as control variables; therefore, I
performed exploratory analyses using the two primary dependent variables (fraud risk
assessment and control risk assessment) and report type and relationship type as
independent variables. I then added each potential control variable as an additional
independent variable one at a time to identify any variables with significant effects. I did
this for all of the potential control variables.
The two control variables that were significantly related to the dependent
variables were public company (fixed effect; = 1 for public company respondents, else 0)
and realistic (covariate; participants’ assessments of the realism of the internal control
issue presented in the case using a scale from 0 to 100). The degree of oversight and
requirements for public companies are significantly different from those of private
companies. Using the public company variable as a control variable is consistent with
that difference in practice, and the hypothetical case uses a public company setting. In
addition, since the case is an experiment whereby the participants are asked to evaluate a
specific internal control challenge, their perception of case realism is also an important
control variable, as it may reflect their prior experiences with such issues and expertise in
evaluating such issues.
The final MANCOVA model used in the study includes the two primary
dependent variables of fraud risk assessment and control risk assessment, report type,
reporting relationship type, the interaction of the IAR report type and relationship type,
and the two control variables of public company and realistic:

57

(FRAUD RISK, CONTROL RISK) = f (REPORT TYPE1, REPORTING
RELATIONSHIP TYPE2, REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE,
PUBLIC COMPANY, REALISTIC)
1

NO REPORT, DESCRIPTIVE REPORT, ASSURANCE REPORT,

DESCRIPTIVE AND ASSURANCE REPORT
2

ACCOUNTABLE CFO, ACCOUNTABLE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR

The results of the MANCOVA are shown in Table 8 below. The results of the
model are significant, with F = 3.12, p < .00001. Four of the five variables are
individually significant, with report type (F = 2.25, p = 0.0399) and relationship type (F =
5.16, p = 0.0074) affecting the participants’ fraud and control risk assessments. The
interaction between report type and relationship type is also significant (F = 2.49, p =
0.0240); see the ANCOVA analyses below for further discussion of the interaction. The
covariate REALISTIC is significant (F = 4.96, p = 0.0089), with the participants making
more conservative risk assessments as their perceptions of case realism increased. Public
company has F = 2.32 and p = 0.1034.7 Observed power is 0.78 for REPORT TYPE, 0.82
for RELATIONSHIP TYPE, and 0.82 for REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE,
all consistent with the typical benchmark of 0.80 (e.g., UCLA 2012c).

7

When I add other potential control variables to this model one at a time (e.g., gender, professional
experience, internal audit experience, title, industry (beyond public company), company revenues,
professional certification, education, case understandability, perceptions of IARs, and actual IAF oversight
in the participant’s organization), each is insignificant (p > 0.05). Masters in accounting, masters in tax, and
CPA were marginally significant (p < 0.10), but did not affect the other results.
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TABLE 8
Overall MANCOVA Results
DVs = Fraud Risk and Control Risk
N = 108
F-statistic

p-value

3.12
2.25
5.16

<.00001
0.0399
0.0074

2.49
2.32
4.96

0.0240
0.1034
0.0089

MODEL
REPORT TYPE
RELATIONSHIP TYPE
REPORT TYPE X
RELATIONSHIP TYPE
PUBLIC COMPANY
REALISTIC

ANCOVAs and Planned Contrast Testing
In order to test the hypotheses, I use individual ANCOVAs for fraud risk
assessment and control risk assessment, using the controls and interaction term from the
MANCOVA model. In addition, I use planned contrast testing to test the individual
report type levels (levels 1, 2, 3, and 4). For example, when comparing level 1 to level 2
the contrasts were coded 1, -1, 0, 0 (UCLA 2012a). Hypotheses H1A – H1C predict an
ordering in that fraud risk and control risk assessments are expected to be in the
following order by report type: no report < activities-based report < assurance-based
report < activities-based and assurance-based report. The ANCOVA results are shown in
Table 9, and the planned contrast testing results are shown in Table 10 below. The
adjusted R-squares are 14.43% and 19.89% for the fraud risk and control risk
ANCOVAs, respectively.
Overall, the ANCOVA results for REPORT TYPE are significant for fraud risk
assessment (F = 3.23, p = 0.0259) and are not significant for control risk assessment (F =
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1.70, p = 0.1727).8 Thus, H1A – H1C are not supported for control risk, and planned
contrasts are needed to identify the specific significant differences for fraud risk. As
shown in Table 10, the planned contrasts reveal significant differences (p < 0.05) across
the levels of report type, except for no report versus activities-based report (p = 0.3679)
and assurance-based report versus activities-based and assurance-based report (p =
0.6608). Thus, there is considerable support for H1. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud
risk assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no
external report.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that internal auditors primarily reporting to the audit
committee chair will make more conservative judgments than internal auditors primarily
reporting to management. This hypothesis is strongly supported for control risk
assessment (F = 10.11, p = 0.002) and is marginally supported for fraud risk assessment
(F = 3.53, p = 0.0633). Thus, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal
auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments.9
Overall, there is evidence that internal audit report type and reporting relationship
each affect certain internal auditor judgments, increasing the conservatism of certain risk
assessments when accountability to stakeholders or the audit committee increases.

8

For REPORT TYPE, the observed power is 0.73, and Cohen’s f = 0.31, indicating an effect size between
medium (0.25) and large (0.40) (UCLA 2012b). For RELATIONSHIP TYPE, observed power is 0.46, and
Cohen’s f = 0.19, indicating an effect size between small (0.10) and medium (0.25). Thus, the observed
power for RELATIONSHIP TYPE is low, biasing against finding a significant effect.
9
For RELATIONSHIP TYPE, the observed power is 0.88, and Cohen’s f = 0.32, indicating an effect size
between medium (0.25) and large (0.40) (UCLA 2012b).
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As shown in Table 9 below, PUBLIC COMPANY is significant in the control risk
ANCOVA (F = 4.18, p = 0.0436) and not significant in the fraud risk ANCOVA (F =
0.05, p = 0.820). This result may be due to the extreme focus on internal controls for
public companies in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 404. In addition,
Hermanson et al. (2012) find evidence of stronger internal controls in public companies
than in other organizations. Therefore, the control weaknesses presented in the case might
appear to be more sensitive (negative) to participants working in public companies.
The covariate REALISTIC is significant in the fraud risk ANCOVA (F = 10.02, p
= 0.002) and not significant in the control risk ANCOVA (F = 1.80, p = 0.1834). It is
possible that greater case realism is associated with greater appreciation of the potential
for fraud in the revenue scenario.
Finally, there is a significant (p = 0.0046) interaction in the control risk
ANCOVA, REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE.10 Table 11 presents the means
and standard deviations of CONTROL RISK for each of the eight cells. As the table
illustrates, for the CFO relationship type, the mean value of the control risk assessment
for the no report type is 84.07. This value is statistically the same at 87.62 for Report
Type 2 and then statistically decreases (p = 0.0553 two-tailed) to 78.17 for Report Type 3
and 76.94 for Report Type 4. Thus, the control risk assessment declines once the IAR
includes assurance, which is inconsistent with the expected pattern. In this condition, the
IAF reports primarily to the CFO, and the CFO is the leader of the project that is the
subject of the internal control testing.
Conversely, under the ACC relationship type, the control risk mean marginally
increases from Report Type 1 of 81.92 to Report Type 2 of 88.12 (p = 0.0941). The mean
10

For REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE, observed power is 0.88.
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significantly increases from Report Type 2 to Report Type 3 at 95.31 (p = 0.0079) and
holds at 91.33 for Report Type 4. Thus, in the audit committee chair condition, the
control risk assessment increases once the IAR includes assurance, consistent with the
expected pattern.11, 12
TABLE 9
ANCOVA Results
Fraud Risk and Control Risk
N = 108
DV = Fraud Risk
MODEL
REPORT TYPE
RELATIONSHIP
TYPE
REPORT TYPE X
RELATIONSHIP
TYPE
PUBLIC COMPANY
REALISTIC

DV = Control Risk

F-statistic

p-value

F-statistic

p-value

3.00
3.23

0.0033
0.0259

3.95
1.70

0.0003
0.1727

3.53

0.0633

10.11

0.002

1.55
0.05
10.02

0.2069
0.8202
0.0021

4.61
4.18
1.80

0.0046
0.0436
0.1834

11

The Breusch-Pagan test indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity in both ANCOVA models, while the
Levene test indicates heteroskedasticity only in the Control Risk model. Accordingly, I conducted two
sensitivity tests. First, I converted the Fraud Risk and Control Risk variables to ranks and reran the
MANCOVA and ANCOVA models using the ranks as the dependent variables (see Conover 1980;
DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b). The results are consistent with those reported in Tables 8 and 9 (Public
Company is not significant in the MANCOVA). Second, I ran regression models using robust standard
errors (e.g., see DeZoort et al. 2003b). The models I ran were: Fraud Risk [or Control risk] = f (Report
Type [two dummy variables, Activities and Assurance], Relationship Type, Realistic, and Public
Company). In the fraud risk model, Assurance, Relationship Type, and Realistic are related to Fraud Risk
(p < 0.05). In addition, the coefficient on Assurance is greater than the coefficient on Activities (p = 0.085).
These results are similar to those in Table 9. In the Control Risk model, Relationship Type (p < 0.001) and
Public Company (p = 0.063 two-tailed) are related to Control risk. These results also are similar to those
presented in Table 9.
12
If the interaction terms in Table 9 are deleted, the Table 9 results for the other variables are similar, as are
the contrast testing results in Table 10. Also, if I run very simple ANOVAs (i.e., Fraud Risk [Control risk]
= f (Report Type, Relationship Type)), the results are as follows. In the Fraud Risk model, Report Type has
p = 0.1001 and Relationship Type has p = 0.0363. The contrast tests for Report Type reveal differences
between Type 1 and Type 3 (p = 0.0215) and between Type 1 and Type 4 (p = 0.0621). In the Control Risk
model, Relationship Type has p = 0.0018). Thus, the pattern of results is consistent with that reported in
Tables 9 and 10, although somewhat weaker for Report Type. The MANOVA results for a simple model
(Fraud Risk, Control Risk = f (Report Type, Relationship Type)) are similar to the simple model ANOVAs
– Report Type has p = 0.1267 (except p = 0.0660 using Roy’s largest root), and Relationship Type has p =
0.0060. Thus, the inclusion of the covariates produces stronger results for Report Type and Relationship
Type.
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TABLE 10
Planned Contrast Testing to Isolate Effect of Report Type on Fraud Risk
DV = Fraud Risk
F-statistic
p-value
Report 1 vs. Report 2 – No report vs.
activities-based
Report 1 vs. Report 3 – No report vs.
assurance-based
Report 1 vs. Report 4 – No report vs.
activities-based and assurance-based
Report 2 vs. Report 3 – Activitiesbased vs. assurance-based
Report 2 vs. Report 4 - Activitiesbased vs. activities-based and
assurance-based
Report 3 vs. Report 4 – Assurancebased vs. activities-based and
assurance-based

0.90

0.3679

4.38

<.00001

4.77

<.00001

12.3

0.0007

3.92

0.0002

0.44

0.6608

TABLE 11
REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE in Control Risk ANCOVA (p = 0.0046)
Control Risk Means by Cell
Report
Types
Type 1
No
Report

Relationship
Types

Type 1 CFO
Type 2 ACC

Type 2
Descriptive
Report

Mean

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

84.07

12.35 87.61

9.65

81.92

15.03 88.21

8.16

Type 3
Assurance
Report

Mean

Type 4
Descriptive
and Assurance
Report

S.D.

Mean

S.D.

78.17

13.588

76.94

14.06

95.31

5.76

91.33

7.81

Additional Testing of Report Type
In addition to testing the defined hypotheses, I performed additional testing of the
effect of having only two report types (REPORT TYPE01; 0 = no report, 1 = any type of
external IAR). This test may be useful to practice to determine whether the mere presence
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of any external report to external stakeholders has an effect fraud risk or control risk
assessments. I run separate ANCOVAs for fraud risk and control risk, similar to the ones
above, but replacing REPORT TYPE with REPORT TYPE01.
The results (not tabulated) indicate that the presence of any type of external
internal audit report to external stakeholders has a significant effect on the judgments
made by internal auditors when performing fraud risk assessments (p = 0.0067), but not
when performing control risk assessments (p = 0.1219).
ANCOVA Results with Four Secondary Dependent Variables
In order to provide additional insight into the effects of report type and
relationship type, I use individual ANCOVAs for the four secondary dependent variables,
using the controls and interaction term from the MANCOVA model. The ANCOVA
results for control testing hours and justification to the CFO are shown in Table 12, and
the planned contrast testing results (when report type is at least marginally significant)
are shown in Table 13 below.13 The ANCOVA models for control testing experience
level and comfort level with CFO are not significant (model p-values = 0.5008 and
0.0984, respectively) and are not tabulated.
The ANCOVA results for REPORT TYPE are marginally significant for control
testing hours (F = 2.67, p = 0.0519) and justification to the CFO (F = 2.43, p = 0.0699).
As shown in Table 13, the planned contrasts for control testing hours reveal significant

13

The Breusch-Pagan and Levene tests indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity in the Control Testing
Hours ANCOVA in Table 12. Accordingly, I conducted two sensitivity tests. First, I converted the Control
Testing Hours variable to ranks and reran the ANCOVA model using the ranks as the dependent variable
(see Conover 1980; DeZoort et al. 2003a, 2003b). The results for Report Type are no longer significant.
Second, I ran a regression model using robust standard errors (e.g., see DeZoort et al. 2003b). The model I
ran was: Control Testing Hours = f (Report Type [two dummy variables, Activities and Assurance],
Relationship Type, Realistic, and Public company). The overall model was not significant (p = 0.1314).
Based on these results, the Control Testing Hours ANCOVA results in Table 12 and the related planned
contrasts in Table 13 should be interpreted with caution.
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differences (p < 0.05) across report type one and report type two, report type one and
report type three, report type one and report type four. The planned contrasts reveal no
significant differences (p > 0.05 in all cases) across the levels of report type for
justification to CFO (report type three and four are marginally different, p = 0.0766). The
ANCOVA results for RELATIONSHIP TYPE are not significant for control testing
hours (F = 0.16, p = 0.6914) and justification to CFO (F = 0.50, p = 0.4792). Overall, the
results in Tables 12 and 13, along with those in footnote 6, provide very little evidence of
any meaningful effects of report type on these secondary dependent variables.
TABLE 12
ANCOVA – Control Testing Hours and Justification to CFO
Control Testing
Hours

Justification
to CFO

F-statistic

p-value

F-statistic

p-value

MODEL

2.04

0.0427

2.45

0.0145

REPORT TYPE

2.67

0.0519

2.43

0.0699

RELATIONSHIP TYPE

0.16

0.6914

0.50

0.4792

REPORT TYPE X RELATIONSHIP TYPE

1.93

0.1297

2.03

0.1152

PUBLIC COMPANY

4.8

0.0309

3.32

0.0716

REALISTIC

0.08

0.7742

1.36

0.2457
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TABLE 13
Planned Contrast Testing – Control Test Hours and Justification to CFO
Control Testing
Hours
Report 1 vs. Report 2 – No report vs.
activities-based
Report 1 vs. Report 3 – No report vs.
assurance-based
Report 1 vs. Report 4 – No report vs.
activities-based and assurance-based
Report 2 vs. Report 3 – Activities-based
vs. assurance-based
Report 2 vs. Report 4 – Activities-based
vs. activities-based and assurance-based
Report 3 vs. Report 4 – Assurance-based
vs. activities-based and assurance-based

Justification to
CFO

F-statistic

p-value

F-statistic

p-value

3.99

0.0484

0.00

0.997

7.77

0.0064

2.25

0.1368

9.64

0.0025

0.17

0.6777

0.81

0.3698

2.22

0.1397

1.56

0.2153

0.17

0.6767

0.12

0.34

3.2

0.0766

Survey Results
In addition to the experiment materials, the instrument included eight survey
questions to assess the participants’ support level for the issuance of various IARs, to
understand the perceived costs associated with issuing various IARs, and to gain insight
as to where the internal audit function currently reports in practice.
Since public companies are subject to a higher degree of oversight (e.g.,
Securities and Exchange Commission and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)
and typically have more resources and stronger controls than do non-public companies
(e.g., Hermanson et al. 2012), responses to these survey questions may vary depending on
whether the respondent works for a public or non-public company. I present the
descriptive statistics segmented by these two groups (public and other) in Table 14 and
perform one-way ANOVAs to identify significant differences between groups.
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Descriptive IAR
As shown in Table 14, participants working for public companies show a
moderate level of support for the issuance of a descriptive IAR (mean = 46.35, S.D. =
29.41), and non-public participants show a higher than moderate level of support (mean =
56.85, S.D. = 30.41). Both groups have high standard deviations, indicating that support
for a descriptive IAR widely varies among the participants. The one-way ANOVA
indicates that the two means of the groups are marginally different, (F = 3.22, p = 0.076).
The most frequent reasons stated for support of a descriptive IAR include
recognition and elevation of the IAF (19 respondents), improved corporate governance
(15 respondents), and benchmarking opportunities (3 respondents).14
Select participants’ responses to support reasons noted above included:
IAF Recognition and Elevation
A report like this to external stakeholders would make the internal audit
department much more important. This would be a great move.
All stakeholders should have an understanding of the Internal Audit
function, its role and responsibilities, organizational and reporting
structure, resource skills and expertise, and the annual efforts completed.
1) Believer in transparency and disclosure. 2) May help in ensuring that
department is adequately staffed and resourced. 3) Motivating tool to
move the department forward.
Improved Corporate Governance
Internal Audit reviews controls at a level few other organizations can. IA
is also the only organization with a holistic perspective of controls.
External stakeholders should receive a report from IA indicating what was
reviewed to assure them the company is not in the habit of by-passing key
controls, especially during a software conversion.

14

Open-ended questions were coded independently by two investigators. These two sets of codes were
compared and any discrepancies were discussed and resolved. There were very few discrepancies noted.
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Such information might provide the user with more assurance regarding
the governance and oversight conditions within a company. However, this
information may become as biased as the Management Discussion and
Analysis section of the financial statements as the internal auditors may be
constrained not to air the full extent of the company’s “dirty laundry”.
1) To promote the independence of internal audit department. 2)
Preventive mitigation of fraud risk 3) The Internal Audit [function] has
better experience and insight and understanding of the operations,
systems, financials and related issues and are in position to provide more
accurate and reliable report about the organization than any external
parties.
Benchmarking Opportunities
It will assist stakeholders to better understand the relevance of internal
audit departments to organizations and provide data for benchmarking.
The most frequent reasons stated for a lack of support for a descriptive IAR
include limited value (10 respondents), not the role of the IAF (8 respondents),
cost/time/resources (2 respondents), and lack of organizational support (2 respondents).
Select participants’ responses to support reasons noted above included:
Limited Value
Most external stakeholders do not even review the annual reports. If they
do, they look for the external auditor opinion. Unless there is some
regulatory requirement for internal audit to produce such a report, it would
seem doing so would merely be a “make work” effort.
I’m not sure that this information would be relevant to external
stakeholders. The information would surely be relevant to the external
auditors, but stakeholders should be able to rely on the external auditor’s
opinion.
Based upon the info above, this would appear to be a fairly limited report
containing only limited insight into the function.
Not the Role of the IAF
I’ve always been of the opinion that Internal Audit serves as the eyes and
ears of management. To that end, management should not be obliged to
answer to external stakeholders.
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External reporting is the role of the external auditors. Internal auditors are
a management tool for monitoring and assurance. Knowing that reports
would be seen by external stakeholders which may ultimately be used for
negative purposes, IA would face resistance in obtaining the necessary
open communications with their clients.
Internal audit works for the management of the company. Reporting to
external stakeholders should be done by company management and/or by
the external auditors.
Cost/Time/Resources
My department has too many requests now and do not need more on our
plate.
Lack of Organizational Support
Not really sure of how much support I would receive to provide to this
idea. I wouldn’t want to publish sensitive audit material to external parties
and the financial guidance already establishes the reports that need to be
shared with external sources. Without providing detail, how helpful would
the report be to stakeholders? And I’m worried about the CFO’s influence
over the content of the report.
The two groups’ mean estimates of the cost of issuing a descriptive IAR (public
mean = 17.71, non-public mean = 17.37) are not statistically different (F = 0.004, p =
0.95). The standard deviations are high (public S.D. = 30.10, non-public S.D. = 24.95),
indicating variability among the respondents. Overall, the mean estimated cost to issue a
descriptive IAR is between 17 – 18%, and the median was 10 – 12%, of the current IAF
budget, which is a significant cost, considering that the report would share only
information about internal audit’s activities.
Assurance IAR
As shown in Table 14, the level of support for issuing an assurance IAR is less
than the scale midpoint of 50 for both public (mean = 35.16, S.D. 26.33) and non-public
(mean = 38.07, S.D. = 30.87) participants. The degree of variability among respondents is
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also high. The mean support for an assurance IAR is not statistically different between
the two groups (F = 0.27, p = 0.61). The most frequent reasons stated for support of an
assurance IAR include improved corporate governance (7 respondents) and recognition
and elevation of the IAF (3 respondents). The participants’ direct quotations for these
reasons were similar to those provided for the support of the descriptive report above.
The most frequent reasons stated for a lack of support for a descriptive IAR
include increased responsibility and risk (17 respondents), not the role of the IAF (14
respondents), overlap with what the external auditors provide (11 respondents),
cost/time/resources (10 respondents), and the magnitude of the change/lack of
organizational support (5 respondents). Many of the participants’ direct quotations for
these reasons were similar to those provided for the support of the descriptive report.
Selected participants’ responses to support the new reasons above, along with some
additional comments related to cost/time/resources noted above, included:
Increased Responsibility and Risk
This is a good idea but I do not know if I would want to have this risk as
the leader of internal audit.
Positive assurance equates to using IA as a scapegoat when things go
wrong. There will always be issues that go uncovered, and no matter how
carefully positive assurance is worded, it can also be used to blame IA for
not finding more.
A report to external stakeholders would introduce significant risk to the
internal audit department. Additionally, the wide variance in what is meant
by effective internal control means that it would be very difficult to
produce a report that is consistent across the internal audit universe.
However, an inconsistent report would produce little of value to external
stakeholders without a consistent and common definition.
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Magnitude of Change
If internal audit were to start to issue assurance reports to the public it
would change the game. I am not sure how it would be implemented.
Good concept, however, my management team would not accept this
unless it was mandated.
Cost/Time/Resources
While an external report of positive assurance could be valuable for
investors, it would also significantly drive the scope of the annual internal
audit plan. To state that historically “material and higher risk” areas would
be evaluated almost implies these areas would need to be audited each and
every year. In any given year, there may be higher risks that should be
audited for that particular year, and the CAE should have that discretion
instead of being forced into more repetitive audits.
I would support this more if I can obtain more resources or get support to
ensure all work is performed timely and accurately.
The mean estimated cost for issuing an assurance IAR for public participants
(mean = 77.80, median = 50, S.D. = 73.69) is much higher than that of non-public
participants (mean = 43.02, median = 36, S.D. = 40.34). The difference in means is
statistically different (F = 9.29, p = 0.003). This may be attributed to the formal control
and review processes typically present in public companies. In both public companies
and other organizations, it is clear that the respondents believe that internal audit budgets
would increase substantially if assurance-based IARs were issued.
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IAF Oversight and Budget Determination
The Institute of Internal Auditors calls for the head of the IAF to receive strategic
direction and reinforcement from the audit committee chair, while also reporting to
management for assistance in establishing direction and support, and as an administrative
interface (IIA 2010a). Under this definition, the balance of oversight would seem to
reside with the audit committee chair, with management operating in more of a support
and interface role. However, Abbott et al. (2010) found a fairly even balance between the
audit committee and management in terms of internal audit oversight.
To provide additional insight into this issue, I asked the respondents about the
nature of their IAF’s oversight. The results (see Table 14) reveal that the non-public
participants indicate the oversight of the IAF resides more closely with management than
with the audit committee chair (mean = 40.97, S.D. = 30.1). This mean is statistically
different (p = 0.026) from the scale midpoint of 50. In addition, the non-public
participants indicate that the IAF budget determination resides more with management
(mean = 26.07, S.D. = 25.42) than with the audit committee chair. This mean is
statistically different (p = <0.001) from the scale midpoint of 50. These findings indicate
that the balance of reporting in practice for the non-public participants resides with
management for both measures of oversight.
The public participants indicated that the oversight of the IAF resides equally
between management and the audit committee chair (mean = 51.76, S.D. = 22.72). This
mean is not statistically different (p = 0.59) from the scale midpoint of 50. In addition,
the public participants indicated that the budget determination (mean = 39.22, S.D. 27.28)
resided more with management than the audit committee chair. This mean is statistically
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different (p = < 0.008) from the scale midpoint of 50. These findings indicate that the
balance of oversight for public participants resides equally with management and the
audit committee chair and resides with management for budget determination.
TABLE 14
Survey Responses
Perceptions of IARs and Actual IAF Oversight

n

Descriptive
IAR

Support Public
Support Non - Public
Cost Public
Cost Non - Public
Assurance
Support Public
IAR
Support Non - Public
Cost Public
Cost Non - Public
Oversight
Public
IAF
Non - Public
Determination Public
IAF Budget
Non - Public

Mean

48
59
49
57
49
58
49
56
49
58
49
56
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46.35
56.85
17.71
17.37
35.16
38.07
77.88
43.02
51.76
40.97
39.22
26.07

S.D

29.41
30.64
30.1
24.95
26.33
30.87
73.69
40.35
22.72
30.1
27.28
25.42

Difference
p-value

0.0757
0.9486
0.6052
0.0029
0.0418
0.012
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
This study examined the effects of IAR type at four levels (no report/current state
of practice, descriptive report of activities, assurance report on the internal controls, and a
descriptive report of activities and an assurance report on the internal controls) and senior
level internal audit’s reporting relationship at two levels (primarily to management or
primarily to the audit committee chair) on internal auditors’ fraud risk and control risk
assessments.
I find that the issuance of an internal audit report (IAR) to external stakeholders
affects internal auditors’ judgments. Specifically, internal auditors’ fraud risk
assessments are higher (more conservative) when the IAR is assurance-based or both
activities and assurance-based than when the report is only activities-based or there is no
external report. Additionally, the results indicate that when the Chief Audit Executive
reports primarily to the Audit Committee Chair (as opposed to management), internal
auditors’ control risk assessments are higher (more conservative). This relation is
marginally significant for fraud risk assessments. Overall, there is evidence that internal
audit report type and reporting relationship each affect internal auditors’ judgments,
increasing the conservatism of certain risk assessments when accountability to
stakeholders or the audit committee increases.
When asked about their perceptions of IARs, the participants indicated a moderate
degree of support for the issuance of an activities-based (descriptive) IAR, citing that

such a report may provide recognition to the internal audit function (IAF), elevate the
status of the IAF, improve corporate governance, and enable benchmarking opportunities.
Participants who did not support the issuance of a descriptive IAR indicated that it may
provide limited value, may not be consistent with the role of an IAF, may be too
costly/time consuming, and may lack required organizational support. Overall, the
participants believe that the issuance of a descriptive IAR would increase the total IAF
budget by an average of over 17 percent.
The participants indicated a modest degree of support for the issuance of an
assurance-based IAR, citing that such a report may increase responsibility and risk to the
IAF, may not be consistent with the role of the IAF, may overlap with the external
auditor’s work, may be costly and require significant time/resources, and represents a
significant change that may not be supported by the organization (also see Archambeault
et al. 2008). The participants indicated the costs associated with issuing such a report
would be extremely high, a mean of 78 percent (43 percent) of the current IAF budget for
public company (non-public company) participants.
The results also reveal that, in actual practice, the balance of internal audit
reporting for the non-public participants resides with management, for both oversight and
budget determination. The balance of oversight for public company participants resides
equally between management and the audit committee chair (consistent with Abbott et al.
2010), and resides primarily with management for budget determination. Thus, in actual
practice, the participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management,
rather than the audit committee.
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This study used an experimental (and survey) design based on case study material
and as such will have certain limitations. These include many standard limitations of this
type of research – external validity, representativeness of the participant group, potential
for demand effects, and small sample size / limited power in some cases. The case
involved only a single scenario, and there was no opportunity for group decision-making
that is found in practice. While this topic has had numerous calls for research, it is a
relatively new topic. As additional research is performed, a greater understanding will be
available to design experiments to address such limitations.
This study has four potential practice implications. First, the results provide
management and audit committee members with insights into how to design internal
audit report types and relationship types to promote effective corporate governance.
These issues are long-standing questions within the practice community, for which
limited academic research has been performed. Specifically, the findings of the study
show that report types and reporting relationships affect internal auditors’ risk
assessments. Report types and reporting relationship types that increase internal audit’s
accountability to stakeholders and to the audit committee result in more conservative
judgments. Second, the study highlights the significant potential costs of externallyissued IARs, which must be weighed against the expected benefits. Third, in their actual
organizations, participants serve in IAFs with significant accountability to management,
rather than the audit committee. Such reporting relationships may impede the
effectiveness of the IAF, as well as the overall effectiveness of corporate governance,
given that the internal audit function plays such a pivotal role in the governance process
(Abbott 2010; Cohen et al. 2004; Gramling et al. 2004). In addition, there may be
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implications for the effectiveness of others within the governance mosaic, such as the
audit committee and the external auditor who rely on the work of the IAF to fulfill their
roles. Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to policy makers, particularly the
Securities and Exchange Commission, as it governs U.S. public company disclosures. I
encourage the SEC to carefully consider the costs and benefits of externally-issued IARs,
especially as this area of research grows.
Finally, the study has implications for research and theory. The study utilizes
accountability theory and agency theory to examine a key area of corporate governance.
In applying these theories in the context of corporate governance, researchers are better
able to understand how greater accountability of internal auditors may induce greater
conservatism and monitoring, tenets of agency theory. In addition, the study responds to
previous calls for academic research and provides a complement to earlier work (Holt
and DeZoort 2009) that examined the effects of IARs on investors’ judgments.
Additional research may be pursued that will advance the understanding of the
potential effects of internal auditor relationship type and report type on other key players
in the corporate governance mosaic (Cohen et al. 2004), such as the audit committee,
senior management, and the external auditor. Gaining insight into these critical
relationships may further advance both practice and theory in the area of corporate
governance.
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From: IIA Chapter President
RE: Important Reminder - Participation in an IIA Award Winning Study
Dear IIA Atlanta Chapter Members:
I am writing to request your participation in an online study being conducted by Doug
Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State
University. This study is part of Doug’s dissertation research focused on improving our
understanding of internal auditors’ judgments. The study has been reviewed by The IIA
Research Foundation and awarded its Michael J. Barrett Doctoral Dissertation Grant.
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 20-25
minutes.
Everyone who completes the survey by Monday, November 7, 2011 will be eligible to
enter a drawing to win one (1) of three $100 gift cards.
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of other participants.
Please click below:
https://scranton.us2.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9BmSyXF1xdsV4jy
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From IIA Chapter President
RE: Important Reminder - Participation in an IIA Award Winning Study
Dear IIA Atlanta Chapter Members:
I am writing to remind you to please participate in an online study being conducted by
Doug Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State
University. This study is part of Doug’s dissertation research focused on improving our
understanding of internal auditors’ judgments. The study has been reviewed by The IIA
Research Foundation and awarded its Michael J. Barrett Doctoral Dissertation Grant.
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 20-25
minutes.
Everyone who completes the survey by Monday, November 7, 2011 will be eligible to
enter a drawing to win one (1) of three $100 gift cards.
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of other participants.
Please click below:
https://scranton.us2.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9BmSyXF1xdsV4jy
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From: IIA Chapter President
RE: Final Reminder - Participation in an IIA Award Winning Study
Dear IIA Atlanta Chapter Members:
I am writing to thank those of you who participated in the online survey being conducted
by Doug Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State
University.
Doug still needs some additional responses to complete the study so I asking those who
did not participate to please take the online study.
This study is part of Doug’s dissertation research focused on improving our
understanding of internal auditors’ judgments. The study has been reviewed by The IIA
Research Foundation and awarded its Michael J. Barrett Doctoral Dissertation Grant.
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 25
minutes.
Everyone who completes the survey by Monday, November 25, 2011 will be eligible
to enter a drawing to win one (1) of three $100 gift cards.
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of other participants.
Please click below:
https://scranton.us2.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_9BmSyXF1xdsV4jy

87

APPENDIX B – COPY OF CASE INSTRUMENT
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Q1

Consent to Participate in “A Study of Internal Auditors’ Judgments”
We are performing a study to better understand internal auditor judgments. This study has
been funded by The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. Your
participation is very important to the success of this study. There are no risks from
completing the survey.
This research examines internal auditor judgments about fraud risk, control risk,
budgeting, and planning based on a limited set of information. While you will receive no
direct benefit for participating, you will be providing a very important contribution to
understanding internal auditor judgments and the audit process. The procedures involve
you evaluating a hypothetical case and responding to a series of questions.
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can discontinue participation at any
time.
You have the right to skip any question that you would prefer not to answer. The
completion of the survey constitutes informed consent to participate in the study. Your
responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of other participants. We will not access or link any
individual identifying information to your response.
If you have any additional comments or questions about the study, please feel free to
contact any of the researchers listed below:
Douglas M. Boyle, CPA, CMA
Assistant Professor of Accounting
The University of Scranton
boyled2@scranton.edu
570.510.3271
Todd DeZoort, Ph.D., CFE
Professor of Accounting
The University of Alabama
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu
205.348.6694
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Dana R. Hermanson, PhD.
Professor of Accounting
Kennesaw State University
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
770.423.6077
By completing the following screens, you are agreeing to participate in this research
project.
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact
Maria Landis, The University of Scranton Research Compliance Coordinator, at (570)
941-6190 or landism2@scranton.edu or Paula Strange, IRB Administrator, Kennesaw
State University IRB Administrator, at (678) 797-2268 or pstrange@kennesaw.edu.
We greatly appreciate your help in our efforts to understand internal auditor judgments!
 I have read the consent to participate above and am willing to participate in the study.
Q2
Instructions
1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case for your consideration and
may not follow current standards and/or practices.
2. The case includes summary background information and a number of questions
for you to answer.
3. Please assume you are working as the Chief Audit Executive for the Company
when evaluating the case and answering the questions.
4. Please complete the materials in the order presented.
5. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a way that
reflects your honest opinions and judgments.
6. The case should take between 20 - 25 minutes to complete.
Thank you for your participation!

90
Q3
Taft Manufacturing, Incorporated
Company and Industry Background
Taft Manufacturing, Inc. (Taft) is a publicly-traded company that manufactures and
distributes sporting equipment to retailers throughout the United States. Taft operates in a
competitive market. Competitive factors in the Company’s market include price, quality,
and customer service. Customer demand has held steady and the industry appears
relatively robust.
Financial Performance
The Company has experienced growth and margins over the years that are comparable to
other companies in the industry. The following financial data have been derived from the
financial statements of the Company. All amounts are in thousands.
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Net sales

$194,432

$204,875

$208,185

$225,647

$237,264

Net income (loss)
Total assets

14,428
80,841

15,247
84,852

12,632
86,465

11,698
94,741

13,254
110,425

Cash flow from operations has remained positive.
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Management and Compensation
Management has been led for the past 20 years by a respected CEO. The CFO is a CPA
with public accounting experience from one of the “Big Four” firms and has been with
the Company for the past 15 years. Management compensation is competitive with the
industry, and incentive compensation (e.g., bonuses, stock options) is primarily based on
operating results, financial position, and cash flow. Profitability and trend level
expectations from analysts, institutional investors, and creditors have been optimistic and
reasonable.
Audit Committee and Auditor
The audit committee is composed of three independent directors. The Audit Committee
Chair (ACC) has been a member of the board for the past 10 years and ACC for the past
five years. The ACC is a CPA with public accounting experience in one of the “Big
Four” accounting firms and has experience as a CFO for a public company. The current
audit firm is one of the “Big Four”. The firm has audited Taft for the past six years, with
no significant audit issues noted during this period.
Internal Controls
Taft has historically had effective internal controls with no reportable conditions or
material weaknesses. The Company is not an accelerated filer and does not have a 404b
opinion from its auditor. Historically, the Company has had adequate accounting
information systems and monitoring of controls, including automated controls and
controls over interim financial reporting (where external reporting is required).
Q4 – Reporting Relationship Manipulation - CFO
Reporting Structure
As head of the Internal Audit Department you have a reporting relationship with the
Audit Committee Chair (ACC) and the CFO, with the ACC taking a much more active
oversight role than the CFO.
You discuss topics with the ACC on a frequent basis and receive feedback and direction
on the scope, timing, and management of the activities of your function. The ACC
approves the charter, risk assessment, and audit plan for your department. You provide
direct communication to the ACC on the results of internal audit activities or other
matters determined to be necessary, including in private meetings. In addition, you meet
with the ACC in preparation for and during the quarterly audit committee meetings.
The ACC ultimately determines your annual performance rating, compensation
adjustment, and future career advancement within the organization. The annual budget
for your department is based on discussions between you and the ACC. The ACC may
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solicit feedback from the CFO to aid in the assessment of your performance and the
determination of your budget.
You discuss topics with the CFO on a quarterly basis. During these discussions you
communicate the direction and support needed from the finance function by your
department to execute your annual audit plan. In practice, the CFO primarily acts as an
administrative point person between your department and the finance organization.
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Q5 - Reporting Relationship Manipulation - ACC
Reporting Structure
As head of the Internal Audit Department you have a reporting relationship with the CFO
and the Audit Committee Chair (ACC), with the CFO taking a much more active
oversight role than the ACC.
You discuss topics with the CFO on a frequent basis and receive feedback and direction
on the scope, timing, and management of the activities of your function. Prior to the
ACC’s formal approval of the charter, risk assessment, and audit plan for your
department, the CFO reviews these materials with you and provides feedback and an
informal approval. You provide direct communication to the CFO on the results of
internal audit activities or other matters determined to be necessary, including in private
meetings. In addition, you meet with the CFO in preparation for the quarterly audit
committee meetings.
The CFO can significantly influence your annual performance rating, compensation
adjustment, and future career advancement within the organization. The annual budget
for your department is largely shaped by discussions between you and the CFO. The CFO
and ACC also discuss your performance and the internal audit budget with each other,
ultimately leading to formal audit committee approval.
You discuss topics with the ACC on a quarterly basis primarily related to the audit
committee meeting. In preparation for these meetings, you and the ACC discuss the key
activities performed by your function since the last meeting and any related findings that
you deem material. In practice, the ACC primarily acts a point person between your
department and the audit committee.
Q6 – Report Type Manipulation – Both External Descriptive and Assurance Report
Internal Audit Reports
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned
engagement. These engagement-level reports are for internal distribution only. The
content of the reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings
with recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your
final reports along with management’s response.
In addition, your department voluntarily issues an overall annual written report to
external stakeholders. This annual internal audit report is included as an appendix to the
Company’s proxy statement and is disclosed on the Company’s website at
www.TaftInc.com.
This report (a) provides descriptive information about your Internal Audit
Department, including sections on internal audit composition, responsibilities,
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accountability, activities, and resources and (b) provides positive assurance on the
effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically deemed to be material
and of higher risk. The revenue cycle has been identified as one of these areas. The report
issued by your department for 2010 is as follows:
Internal Audit Activities Report

Composition
Taft, Inc. maintains an in-house Internal Audit Department that was established in 1991.
The department includes a Chief Audit Executive who supervises five other internal
auditors. The Chief Audit Executive has 10 years of professional experience in internal
auditing and is a CPA and CIA.
Responsibilities
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems.
Accountability
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous
internal monitoring. The results of the most recent external assessment, which was
conducted by a qualified independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit
Department is currently in compliance with all applicable rules of the professional
guidance offered by The Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
Activities
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60%
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit
committee. During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit
committee and the Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit
evaluations of the Company’s risk exposures and internal controls. The Chief Audit
Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial statements and
management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the independent
auditor.
Resources
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For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.
Internal Audit Assurance Report

We have completed the internal audit plan of internal control over the revenue cycle. The
objective of this engagement was to determine whether the Company maintained, in all
material respects, effective internal control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010.
The plan was prepared considering the criteria established in Internal Control –
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission COSO). This Integrated Framework is designed to provide
reasonable assurance that internal controls are established and effectively operating to
achieve organizational objectives in the areas of (1) reliability of financial reporting, (2)
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and (3) effectiveness and efficiency of
operations. The internal audit examined the Company’s internal control over this cycle
based on the results of audit assignments we have completed throughout the year as part
of our integrated audit plan. These internal audits were conducted in accordance with the
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Our audit of
internal control over this cycle included obtaining an understanding of internal control,
assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, and testing and evaluating the design
and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our audits also
included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. The criteria were discussed and agreed with management before the
conduct of detailed audit procedures.

We concluded that the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal
control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010. Our overall opinion on the internal
control over the revenue cycle is satisfactory.
In our professional judgment, sufficient and appropriate audit procedures have been
conducted and evidence gathered to support the accuracy of the conclusions reached and
contained in this report. The conclusions were based on a comparison of the situations as
they existed at the time against the audit criteria. The conclusions are only applicable for
the entity examined. The evidence gathered meets professional audit standards and is
sufficient to provide senior management with proof of the conclusions derived from the
internal audit.
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Q7 - Report Type Manipulation – External Assurance Report [to provide
participants with
information about IAF activities]
Internal Audit Department
The Internal Audit Department at Taft was established in 1991 and includes you as the
Chief Audit Executive and five other internal auditors. You have 10 years of professional
experience in internal auditing and are a CPA and CIA.
Responsibilities
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems.
Accountability
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous
internal monitoring.
The results of the most recent external assessment, which was conducted by a qualified
independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit Department is currently in
compliance with all applicable rules of the professional guidance offered by The Institute
of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal
Auditing.
Activities
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60%
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit
committee.
During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit committee and the
Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit evaluations of the
Company’s risk exposures and internal controls.
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The Chief Audit Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial
statements and management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the
independent auditor.

Resources
For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.
Q8 - Report Type Manipulation – External Assurance Report
Internal Audit Reports
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned
engagement. These engagement-level reports are for internal distribution only. The
content of the reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings
with recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your
final reports along with management’s response.
In addition, your department voluntarily issues an overall annual written report to
external stakeholders. This annual internal audit report is included as an appendix to the
Company’s proxy statement and is disclosed on the Company’s website at
www.TaftInc.com.
This report provides positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in
areas that have historically deemed to be material and of higher risk. The revenue cycle
has been identified as one of these areas. The report issued by your department for 2010
is as follows:
Internal Audit Assurance Report
We have completed the internal audit plan of internal control over the revenue cycle. The
objective of this engagement was to determine whether the Company maintained, in all
material respects, effective internal control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010.
The plan was prepared considering the criteria established in Internal Control –
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO). This Integrated Framework is designed to provide
reasonable assurance that internal controls are established and effectively operating to
achieve organizational objectives in the areas of (1) reliability of financial reporting, (2)
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and (3) effectiveness and efficiency of
operations. The internal audit examined the Company’s internal control over this cycle
based on the results of audit assignments we have completed throughout the year as part
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of our integrated audit plan. These internal audits were conducted in accordance with the
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Our audit of
internal control over this cycle included obtaining an understanding of internal control,
assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, and testing and evaluating the design
and operating effectiveness of internal control based on the assessed risk. Our audits also
included performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. The criteria were discussed and agreed with management before the
conduct of detailed audit procedures.
We concluded that the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal
control over this cycle as of December 31, 2010. Our overall opinion on the internal
control over the revenue cycle is satisfactory.
In our professional judgment, sufficient and appropriate audit procedures have been
conducted and evidence gathered to support the accuracy of the conclusions reached and
contained in this report. The conclusions were based on a comparison of the situations as
they existed at the time against the audit criteria. The conclusions are only applicable for
the entity examined. The evidence gathered meets professional audit standards and is
sufficient to provide senior management with proof of the conclusions derived from the
internal audit.
Q9 - Report Type Manipulation – External Descriptive Report
Internal Audit Reports
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned
engagement. These engagement-level reports are for internal distribution only. The
content of the reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings
with recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your
final reports along with management’s response.
In addition, your department voluntarily issues an overall annual written report to
external stakeholders. This annual internal audit report is included as an appendix to the
Company’s proxy statement and is disclosed on the Company’s website at
www.TaftInc.com.
This report provides descriptive information about your Internal Audit Department,
including sections on internal audit composition, responsibilities, accountability,
activities, and resources. The report issued by your department for 2010 is as follows:

Internal Audit Activities Report
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Composition
Taft, Inc. maintains an in-house Internal Audit Department that was established in 1991.
The department includes a Chief Audit Executive who supervises five other internal
auditors. The Chief Audit Executive has 10 years of professional experience in internal
auditing and is a CPA and CIA.
Responsibilities
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems.
Accountability
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous
internal monitoring. The results of the most recent external assessment, which was
conducted by a qualified independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit
Department is currently in compliance with all applicable rules of the professional
guidance offered by The Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
Activities
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60%
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit
committee. During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit
committee and the Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit
evaluations of the Company’s risk exposures and internal controls. The Chief Audit
Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial statements and
management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the independent
auditor.
Resources
For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.
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Q10 - Report Type Manipulation – No External Report [to provide participants
with
information about IAF activities]
Internal Audit Department
The Internal Audit Department at Taft was established in 1991 and includes you as the
Chief Audit Executive and five other internal auditors. You have 10 years of professional
experience in internal auditing and are a CPA and CIA.
Responsibilities
The Internal Audit Department acts under a written charter that is updated annually. The
Internal Audit Department provides assurance and consulting activities designed to add
value and improve the Company’s operations, and is responsible for evaluating risk
exposures relating to the Company’s governance, operations, and information systems.
Accountability
The Internal Audit Charter specifies that the Internal Audit Department’s independence is
established by the Company’s organizational and reporting structure. The Internal Audit
Department has a reporting relationship with the Audit Committee Chair and the CFO.
The Internal Audit Department maintains a quality assurance and improvement program
that covers all aspects of internal audit activity and includes periodic internal
assessments, external quality assessments at least once every five years, and continuous
internal monitoring. The results of the most recent external assessment, which was
conducted by a qualified independent reviewer in 2009, indicate that the Internal Audit
Department is currently in compliance with all applicable rules of the professional
guidance offered by The Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
Activities
The Internal Audit Department’s activities during 2010 were approximately 60%
assurance-related and 40% consulting-related. The scope of these activities was
determined by an evaluation of company risk exposures approved by the audit
committee.
During 2010, the Chief Audit Executive met formally with the audit committee and the
Company’s independent auditors each quarter to discuss internal audit evaluations of the
Company’s risk exposures and internal controls.
The Chief Audit Executive also reviewed and discussed the Company’s audited financial
statements and management report on internal controls with the audit committee and the
independent auditor.
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Resources
For fiscal 2010, the total cost of maintaining the Internal Audit Department was
$800,000. This amount includes salaries and administrative overhead, and represents
approximately .5% of the Company’s total operating expenses.
Q11 - Report Type Manipulation – No External Report
Internal Audit Reports
As part of your audit process, your department issues a written report after each assigned
engagement. All of your reports are for internal distribution only. The content of the
reports varies by assignment but typically includes a summary of findings with
recommendations to management. The audit committee receives copies of all your final
reports along with management’s response.
Q12
System Conversion and Related Internal Control Issues
Taft has recently gone through an operational and financial system conversion. The
conversion involved the replacement of all key systems. The conversion was
implemented by an in-house team reporting to the CFO. The CFO strongly lobbied
for this initiative and recommended that the system be implemented by an in-house team.
The Internal Audit Department did not play any significant role in the conversion
decision or implementation process.
The conversion was completed in the second quarter of the current fiscal year (2011) and
has not gone as smoothly as planned. In particular, the controls that were operating
effectively under the prior system for the revenue cycle needed to be re-built into the new
system. Of particular concern to your department are controls related to the recording of
revenue. Company policy requires that prior to the recognition of revenue, a matching
process must be performed whereby the approved customer purchase order and shipping
document are reviewed, matched, and approved by the billing manager.
During the third quarter, as part of its annual audit plan, your Internal Audit Department
performed a preliminary walk-through of the revenue cycle to assess fraud risk and
control risk in preparation for year-end testing. During this walk-through and
related testing, it was revealed that the control procedures (related to matching the
purchase order and shipping document) had not been consistently documented or
performed. In particular, your control testing revealed that 18% of the 200 sample items
resulted in an exception (i.e., the proper documentation that the control was performed
was missing or incomplete). These control deficiencies could lead to a material
misstatement in the financial statements for the current fiscal year, 2011.
When your staff made inquiries to the related management regarding these control
deficiencies, they were told that “the conversion significantly impacted the operation, and
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we did not have enough time to perform all of the procedures as we had done prior to the
conversion. Our primary focus was to get the inventory shipped to the customers to meet
their needs and work on the related paperwork later as time permitted.” They also
responded that the CFO was aware of these issues and supported that approach.
You are now considering the fraud risk and control risk related to this cycle and the
time needed for testing in this cycle for the current year-end (2011) audit, given the
situation described above.
Q13
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented.
Unless otherwise indicated, you may refer back to the case materials when
answering the questions.
Do not change your responses once they are recorded.
Q14
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar
to indicate your opinion as to the level of financial statement fraud risk associated with
the revenue cycle for this fiscal year (0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk,
and 100 represents high risk).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q15
Please briefly explain your rationale.
Q16
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar
to indicate your opinion as to the level of control risk associated with the revenue cycle
for this fiscal year (0 represents low risk, 50 represents moderate risk, and 100 represents
high risk).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q17
Please briefly explain your rationale.
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Q18
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar
to indicate how many hours would you expect to spend on the revenue cycle control
testing during the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal year-end
audit (-50 represents significantly fewer hours this year, 0 represents the same amount of
hours, and 50 represents significantly more hours this year).
Sliding scale -50 to 50
Q19
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar
to indicate how important it would be to justify to the Chief Financial Officer the audit
hours you have budgeted to audit internal control over the revenue cycle (0 represents not
at all important, 50 represents moderately important, and 100 represents very important).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q20
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar
to indicate the experience level of the staff you would assign to the revenue cycle
control testing for the current year-end internal audit as compared to the prior fiscal
year-end audit (-50 represents significantly less experience this year, 0 represents the
same amount of experience, and 50 represents significantly more experience this year).
Sliding scale -50 to 50
Q21
Based only on the information presented in the case materials, please slide the below bar
to indicate how comfortable you would be in reporting the preliminary internal control
deficiency findings (18% exceptions) to the Chief Financial Officer (-50 represents very
uncomfortable, 0 represents neutral, and 50 represents very comfortable).
Sliding scale -50 to 50
Q22
Please answer the following questions without referring back to the prior screens. It is
very important to not go back to prior screens.
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Q23 – Manipulation Check – Reporting Relationship
In this case, who most actively oversees the Internal Audit Department?
 Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
 Audit Committee Chair (ACC)
Q24 – Manipulation Check – Report Type
In this case, your Internal Audit Department produces the following voluntary (not
required) reports to external stakeholders:
 No reporting to external stakeholders – all internal audit reports are for internal use
only.
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes only
descriptive information about the internal audit function.
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that provides only positive
assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically
deemed to be material and of higher risk.
 An overall annual written report to external stakeholders that includes both
descriptive information about the internal audit function and provides positive
assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have historically
deemed to be material and of higher risk.
Q25
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how realistic the case was in regards to the
system conversion and related audit considerations (0 represents very unrealistic, 50
represents moderately realistic, and 100 represents very realistic).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q26
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how understandable this case was (0 represents
very difficult to understand, 50 represents moderately understandable, and 100 represents
very understandable).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q27
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Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual written report to
external stakeholders that includes descriptive information about the internal audit
function such as its composition, responsibilities, accountability, activities, and resources.
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, your personal level of support for such an
external report (0 represents no support, 50 represents moderate support, and 100
represents full support).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q28
Please explain your rationale.
Q29
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it would cost for your
internal audit department to issue an annual report to external stakeholders that
provides descriptive information about the internal audit function such as its
composition, responsibilities, accountability, activities, and resources. (Please state the
cost estimate as a percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).
Sliding scale 0% to 300%
Q30
Some have called for internal audit departments to provide an annual written report to
external stakeholders that provides positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal
control in areas that have historically deemed to be material and of higher risk. Please
indicate by sliding the bar below, your personal level of support for such an external
report (0 represents no support, 50 represents moderate support, and 100 represents full
support).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q31
Please explain your rationale.
Q32
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, how much you believe it would cost for your
internal audit department to issue an annual report to external stakeholders that
provides positive assurance on the effectiveness of internal control in areas that have
historically deemed to be material and of higher risk. (Please state the cost estimate as a
percentage of your current total annual internal audit budget).
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Sliding scale 0% to 300%

Q33
The questions that follow are for classification purposes only. No effort will be made to
identify you based on the information you provide.
Q34
What is your gender?
 Female
 Male
Q35
Please provide your total years of professional business experience, including years as an
internal auditor.
 Less than 5 years






5 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 to 25 years
Over 25 years

Q36
Please provide your total years of professional experience as an internal auditor.







Less than 5 years
5 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 to 25 years
Over 25 years

Q37
Please provide your current title.
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Chief Audit Executive (or other equivalent title) (1)
Director of Internal Audit (2)
Manager of Internal Audit (3)
Accounting/Consulting Firm Partner (4)
Accounting/Consulting Firm Senior Manager (5)
Accounting/Consulting Firm Manager (6)
Other (please provide below) (7) ____________________

Q38
Please indicate the segment(s) in which you currently work.








Consulting (1)
Government (2)
Public Accounting (3)
Public Company (4)
Private For-Profit Company (5)
Not-For-Profit (6)
Other (7)

Q39
Please indicate the approximate annual revenue of your employer.










Less than $10 million (1)
$10 million to $50 million (2)
$51 million to $100 million (3)
$101 million to $200 million (4)
$201 million to $300 million (5)
$301 million to $400 million (6)
$401 million to $500 million (7)
$501 million to $1 billion (8)
Over $1 billion (9)

Q40
Please indicate below any professional certifications that you hold (check all that apply).






CIA (1)
CFA (2)
CFE (3)
CMA (4)
CPA (5)
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 I do not hold any of the above professional certifications (6)

Q41
Please indicate your educational status (check all that apply).









Undergraduate Degree in Accounting (1)
Other Undergraduate Degree (2)
MBA (3)
Masters in Accountancy (4)
Masters in Taxation (5)
Other Masters Degree (6)
Doctoral Degree in Accounting (7)
Other Doctoral Degree (8)

Q42
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, the degree to which management and the
audit committee actively oversee the Internal Audit Department in
your organization (0 represents oversight is provided almost exclusively by
management, 50 represents equal oversight by management and the audit committee, and
100 represents oversight is provided almost exclusively by the audit committee).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q43
Please indicate by sliding the bar below, which group has the greatest influence over the
determination of the Internal Audit Department’s budget in your organization (0
represents it is almost exclusively influenced by management, 50 represents it is
equally influenced by management and the audit committee, and 100 represents it
is almost exclusively influenced by the audit committee).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q44
If you have any additional thoughts about this case, write them here:
Q45
Thank you for completing the survey.
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Your responses have been recorded and will remain strictly confidential. If you would
like to be entered in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing and/or receive a
summary report of the aggregate survey responses, please check the appropriate boxes
below and provide an e-mail address where we may contact you for these purposes.
(Your e-mail address will only be used for these purposes and will be disassociated from
your survey responses.)
 Please enter me in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing. (12)
 Please send me a summary report of the survey responses. (8)
Q46
Email address:

